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There is perhaps no greater fiction in the United States than the idea that we
are worried about being fat because of its implications for our health . . . .  [I]t
is not because our obesity actually represents a verifiable health threat.
Rather, it is because we are afraid of fat.1
 Copyright held by Rebecca L. Rausch.
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of California, Berkeley, School of Law, 2011; J.D., Northeastern University
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1. J. ERIC OLIVER, FAT POLITICS: THE REAL STORY BEHIND AMERICA’S OBESITY EPI-
DEMIC 76 (2006); see also Pat Lyons, Prescription for Harm: Diet Industry Influ-
ence, Public Health Policy, and the “Obesity Epidemic,” in THE FAT STUDIES
READER 75, 75 (Esther Rothblum & Sondra Solovay eds., 2009) (“Fear of fat is not
new . . . .”).
920
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fearing fatness2 blinds America from certain realities of body size,
health status, and access to health care.  American society, through
the health care system and other mechanisms, has created a fat-thin
dichotomy within which thin is good and fat is bad.3  Recently, em-
ployers began reinforcing this dichotomy by imposing on employees
whose weight renders them “obese” on the Body Mass Index (BMI)
certain additional health insurance costs—referred to herein as
health insurance fat taxes.4  Stated otherwise, if an employee’s BMI
exceeds the employer-prescribed limit, that employee must pay more
for health insurance than his or her thin colleagues, unless the fat
employee attempts to slim down or provides the employer with a doc-
2. This Article employs the terms “fat” and “fatness” instead of “obesity” or “over-
weight” in an attempt both to reclaim the word “fat” and to avoid constant indi-
rect support for the medicalization of fatness. See, e.g., ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT
RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD ix (2008); Deborah L. Rhode,
The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2009).  Use of the
words “obese,” “morbidly obese,” and the like is intended to specifically reference
a Body Mass Index category. See Rhode, supra, at 1036.  Hopefully, these terms
appear only when necessary to the analysis.
3. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS passim (2010).
4. To be fair, the additional costs that employers impose on fat employees for their
health insurance are not truly taxes.  Taxes are fees or charges imposed by the
government on people and other entities for purposes of raising public revenue.
See F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 47
(1927); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Comment, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 932 (1975) (quoting Wil-
liam Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113, 1165–66 (1974)).  Taxes frequently apply to particular population
groups—for example, wage-earners.  Similarly, health insurance fat taxes apply
to a particular segment of people, for example, those whose BMIs are too high.
With the advent of mandatory health insurance and the increasing popularity
among employers to charge more for fat people to access health coverage, as dis-
cussed herein, these higher charges essentially function like a tax—they are uni-
versal charges applicable to everyone in the target population group. Cf. Alice G.
Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4–6, 9–12
(1996); Alice G. Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1355, 1377–78 (1996).  Indeed, one noted scholar identifies
the mandatory union membership of the 1950s and the unions’ collective bargain-
ing for health insurance through employment as a “private tax system”:
The union shop, which in the early fifties made union membership
mandatory for over two thirds of the production work force, enabled the
unions to establish a “private fiscal system” able to levy a “tax” for
health insurance.  The government supported this private tax system by
making employers’ contributions into it exempt from the government’s
own taxes.  Private voluntary insurance was neither strictly voluntary,
nor strictly private, but its compulsory and public features were hardly
noticed.
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 334 (1982).
With the individual mandate, the private tax system is now becoming more of a
widespread reality.
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tor’s note stating that the weight cannot be lost.5  Employers use these
health insurance fat taxes to unevenly pass through to employees the
costs of health insurance coverage, in an effort to reduce their own
contributory costs for that insurance.6  Simultaneously, employers re-
duce the insurance costs for thin employees who do not, at least based
on their body sizes, drive up the overall costs.7
Essentially, health insurance fat taxes increase the costs of fat-
ness.  Those costs, however, are not limited to budgetary bottom lines.
Fatness carries a heavy weight of systemic stigma.8  Fat individuals
are viewed as lazy, slovenly, and lacking self-control.9  In general, fat
people earn less money, find love less frequently, and feel more self-
loathing than their thinner counterparts.10  They regularly suffer
through tormenting and teasing at schools, places of work, and the
grocery store.11  The costs of fatness run deep.
Rather than contributing to a solution, health insurance fat taxes
contribute to the problems by imposing both overt and covert penalties
for fatness.  The overt financial and access repercussions speak for
themselves.  Covertly, health insurance fat taxes force fat individuals
to cover12 their fatness.  Professor Kenji Yoshino describes covering as
one of three methods of forced assimilation, the other two—converting
and passing—being slightly better known.13  Converting occurs when
an individual is socially required to fundamentally change an underly-
ing identity.14  Passing occurs when an individual maintains the un-
derlying identity, but is socially required to hide it.15  Covering occurs
when an individual acknowledges and embraces the underlying iden-
tity, but is socially required to make that underlying identity easier
for others to ignore.16  “Covering means the underlying identity is
neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed.  Covering occurs when
a lesbian both is and says she is a lesbian, but otherwise makes it easy
for others to disattend her orientation.”17  Covering is systemically
problematic for at least three reasons: first, it creates and reinforces
social norms about people’s identities; second, it undermines individu-
als’ senses of self and self-worth; and third, it misplaces focus on a
5. See infra section II.B.
6. See infra section II.B.
7. See infra section II.B.
8. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 72–76; Rhode, supra note 2, at 1037–41. R
9. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 3, at 29.
10. See, e.g., id. at 26–27.
11. See, e.g., SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FIGHTING WEIGHT-
BASED DISCRIMINATION 25 (2000).
12. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
13. Id. at 772.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id.
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singular component of people’s identities when identities are rarely
that simple.18  As will be explained further in Parts IV and V, this
Article posits that health insurance fat taxes force fat individuals to
cover their fatness by mandating an implicit acknowledgement that
fat is bad and unhealthy.  To escape the financial penalties, fat people
must either follow a weight loss program, attempting to convert but
probably failing,19 or state that their fatness is beyond their control,
rendering them helpless and victimized.  Health insurance fat taxes
do not hit fat people only in their wallets.  This developing regime also
strikes at personhood and identity by requiring fat individuals to ad-
mit and embrace the socially constructed vision of their bodies as
plainly wrong.
These health insurance fat taxes classify individuals as good or
bad, desirable or objectionable, rewarded or penalized, because of an
identified health status factor that is evaluated on a scale having no
basis in medical science and that might be wholly arbitrary vis-a`-vis
actual health.20  As will be discussed, scientists dispute the causes of
fatness.  One school of thought believes that fatness is a disease
caused by genetics and other biologics, rendering fatness basically im-
mutable.21  Another school of thought believes that fatness is wholly
mutable, caused not by biology but by choice and environmental fac-
tors, such as sedentary lifestyles and diets too rich in calorie-dense
foods.22  The truth probably lies somewhere between these two ex-
tremes, involving both nature and nurture, but that truth currently
escapes modern science.  Assuming such a combination of causes,
health insurance fat taxes both penalize for an immutable characteris-
tic (nature) and make the health care system more difficult for fat peo-
ple to access by increasing coverage costs, which access they arguably
need in order to change their body size (nurture).  As discussed in Part
III, the health care system presents fiscal, social, and emotional chal-
lenges for fat people; making the system even harder to access seems
to miss the public policy mark.
In addition, the effects of fatness are more complex than modern
medical science can yet fully appreciate.23  Perhaps fatness causes di-
abetes, coronary artery disease, and other health problems.  Con-
versely, perhaps fatness is merely a symptom of other conditions that
standing alone has no causal relationship with overall health, despite
any apparent correlative relationships.  Fat people can have normal
18. Cf. Eli Clare, Resisting Shame: Making Our Bodies Home, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 455, 457–61 (2010); Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1809, 1815-25 (2007); Yoshino, supra note 12, at 781. R
19. Studies show that up to 95% of diets fail. See Lyons, supra note 1, at 77. R
20. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 3, at 24–25; infra section III.A.
21. See infra section III.B.
22. See infra section III.B.
23. See infra section III.A.
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cholesterol counts, blood pressure, and blood sugar levels, but they are
nonetheless financially penalized for their fatness under the health
insurance fat tax regime.  Either way, this new regime is flawed.  If
fatness causes other health problems, then fat people are precisely the
ones who should be accessing the health care system, and yet they are
also the ones who, because of health insurance fat taxes, face addi-
tional obstacles on their way to that system to manage their condition.
Alternatively, if fatness is a symptom of something else and on its own
yields no serious health consequences, then the penalty arises out of
an arbitrary and irrelevant physical characteristic.
While the science can be debated, at bottom, the science bears lim-
ited relevance to the underlying argument set forth herein.  Why
choose fatness as the predominant identifier of increased health ac-
cess costs?  The answer must be that America fears fat; no similar ac-
cess cost increase exists for the underweight, even though that body
size can lead to significant health detriments and drive up the cost of
care.24  Further, where the public policy goal is to encourage people to
be healthier, imposing health insurance fat taxes is a poor method-
ological choice.
Though uneven costs based on an arbitrarily selected physical fea-
ture might seem discriminatory, health insurance fat taxes are per-
fectly legal under federal law.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of
199025 (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 (Title VII)
generally do not protect people because of their fatness.27  The re-
cently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 201028
(ACA) also allows, and encourages, this new regime to continue, under
the guise of wellness programs.29  Ironically, despite the name, these
programs do not necessarily measure wellness, nor are they required
to do so.30
The legality of health insurance fat taxes generates another set of
questions, namely, why the law functions in this particular way and
24. See, e.g., Katherine M. Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated With Underweight,
Overweight, and Obesity, 293 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 1861 (2005); RHODE, supra
note 3, at 41 (“Recent research finds that moderately overweight individuals have R
the lowest mortality rates of any weight group; thin individuals who match cul-
tural ideals have the highest rates.  Low body weight compromises reproductive
and work capacity, and predicts a greater frequency of sickness.” (citation
omitted)).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
27. See infra section V.A.
28. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201(4), 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010).
29. See infra section V.B.  The wellness program provisions are also known as the
Safeway Amendment. See Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy and Ethics
of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETH-
ICS 450, 451 (2011).
30. See infra section V.B.
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whether it should function differently.  This Article posits that the
current functionality reflects a different type of covering, by which so-
ciety forces itself to make certain of its underlying identities—in this
case, anti-fat bias—a little less obvious.  While this is not the individ-
ualized covering Professor Yoshino originally discussed,31 this Article
attempts to expand upon that conception.  As a whole, society avoids
admitting that its shortcomings, such as anti-fat bias, exist.  Collec-
tive society pushes to cover its collective flaws.  Specifically, systemic
fear of fatness and losing the currency ascribed to thinness allows the
law to permit and promote the existence and expansion of this new
regime.  Health insurance fat taxes exemplify the concept of what will
be termed herein collective cover-up.
Part II explores fatness and health insurance, focusing on the con-
trast between the traditional communitarian health care model and
health insurance fat taxes.  This Part also details various health in-
surance fat tax programs either implemented or proposed across the
country.  Part III critiques the science of fatness, manifested through
BMI, and the construction of fatness as a disease.  Part IV discusses
the systemic implications of fatness and draws certain parallels be-
tween social treatments of fatness and queerness.  These parallels
provide a useful basis for applying Professor Yoshino’s covering theory
to fatness.  Part V examines legal regimes that generally seem as if
they might prohibit the anti-fat discrimination of health insurance fat
taxes, but do not.  Using these legal regimes as a lens, Part V then
explores the expansion of covering to the whole of society and the ways
in which fatness begets collective cover-up.  Finally, Part VI offers
some concluding thoughts and questions about how the law might
push social norms such that anti-fat discrimination could become less
pervasive and public health goals might be better achieved.
II. FATNESS AND HEALTH INSURANCE
Health care finance in America grew from a community-based
model; in today’s group market, usually people do not pay extra for
insurance coverage based on health status.  Health insurance fat
taxes, however, change that paradigm.  This Part provides a historical
perspective on the American communitarian health care model, fol-
lowed by detailed descriptions of health insurance fat taxes and simi-
lar schemes, which schemes represent a notable shift away from that
communitarian model.
31. Yoshino, supra note 12.
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A. The Communitarian Model of Health Care
The foundation of our health care finance system rests upon com-
munitarian ideals.32  American health insurance plans originated in
the period following the Great Depression as a method of creating a
more reliable flow of payment to hospitals for services rendered.33
These hospital-sponsored health plans, which eventually became the
Blue Cross plans, operated on a community rating system through
which each plan beneficiary paid the same premium costs, determined
based on geography, irrespective of the beneficiary’s other health sta-
tus factors.34  These hospital plans quickly gained popularity and by
1937, one million people were covered.35  Physicians saw the success
of the Blue Cross hospital plans and soon created similar Blue Shield
plans, also operated on a community rating basis.36
While most of the early Blue Cross and Blue Shield beneficiaries
enrolled individuals or groups based on geographic communities, the
health insurance enrollment system soon shifted to an employer-
based model, creating communities through the workplace.37  In 1954,
the Internal Revenue Service overhauled the tax code such that em-
ployer contributions to health insurance premium costs, as a non-tax-
able form of compensation and a claimed business expense for
employers, became more cost-effective than other forms of employee
compensation.38  In light of the tax and other incentives for employ-
ers, including rebates offered by commercial insurers, by the late
1950s, health insurance was a standard component of employee com-
pensation packages offered by most major employers.39  Rates of em-
ployee enrollment in employer-sponsored health insurance continued
to rise,40 reaching a peak of 66.8% enrollment of non-elderly Ameri-
cans in 2000.41  Though employer-sponsored insurance enrollment
32. See Mark Schlesinger, Paradigms Lost: The Persisting Search for Community in
U.S. Health Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 937, 938–39, 948–49, 950
(1997).
33. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical De-
velopment and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 141, 143 (1993).
34. D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40834,
THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3–4, 6 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40834.pdf; Bovbjerg et al., supra
note 33, at 143. R
35. AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 3. R
36. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 33, at 143. R
37. AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 6. R
38. Id. at 5; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 33, at 145. R
39. AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 5–6. R
40. Cf. Jill Quandagno, Physician Sovereignty and the Purchasers’ Revolt, 29 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 815, 824–26 (2004) (describing cost containment con-
cerns and efforts from corporate purchasers of health insurance).
41. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—
Origins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
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has declined slightly since the peak, more than half of non-elderly
Americans still obtain coverage through this method.42  The number
of non-elderly Americans who purchase insurance through their em-
ployers will remain nearly constant after implementation of the ACA’s
Health Insurance Exchanges (HIEs) through which both employed
and unemployed individuals may purchase insurance coverage.43
Both the employer-sponsored plans and the HIEs will continue the
practice of community rating in some form.44  Essentially, community
rating “is a method of pooling risks so that the financial burden of
medical care is distributed among many people. . . .  [M]oney is shifted
from those who remain healthy to those who become sick or injured.”45
In a pure community rating system, such as the original hospital-
based insurance plans created in the 1930s, premium costs are set by
geographic location only, without consideration of other demographic
or health factors.46  The current U.S. health insurance market per-
42. The Uninsured, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (Dec. 2010), http://www.kff.
org/uninsured/upload/7451-06.pdf; Diane Rowland et al., Focus on Health Re-
form: Health Care and the Middle Class, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 3–4
(July 2009), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7951.pdf.  The elderly popu-
lation (age 65 and over) is excluded from these measurements because most of
this segment of the population is covered by Medicare.  Rowland et al., supra, at
3.  The statistics focus on the population that would normally be purchasing in-
surance. Id.
43. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN MARCH 2010 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
121xx/doc12119/03-30-healthcarelegislation.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTI-
MATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 111-148) AND THE
HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 (P.L. 111-152) 1
(2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/factsheets/2011b/HealthInsurance
Provisions.pdf; PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN
STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 239 (2011); The Uninsured, supra note 42, R
at 24; Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon.
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at 9–10, app. tbl.4 (Mar.
20, 2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendRecon
Prop.pdf.
44. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1252, 124
Stat. 119, 162 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18012) (creating the HIEs);
AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 52 (discussing the use of cooperative R
health insurance policies, which would be available to eligible individuals
through HIEs created by health insurance reform legislation); see also Stephen
D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 377, 412 (2003) (arguing that differential pricing for health insurance
premiums may be against the interests of employers, and even if that differential
premium is practically valuable, social externalities may preclude realistic
value).
45. AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 11; see also STARR, supra note 4, at R
329–30 (“community rates keep down costs for high-risk groups”).
46. See Consumer Guide to Group Health Insurance, NAT’L ASS’N OF HEALTH UNDER-
WRITERS, http://nahu.org/consumer/GroupInsurance.cfm (last visited Apr. 28,
2011) [hereinafter NAHU]; supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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petuates certain hybrid models that incorporate both community and
experience rating components.47
Under one option, sometimes referred to as “modified” or “ad-
justed” community rating, insurers offering plans to small employers
base the premium rates on geographic location (pure community rat-
ing) plus claims history and certain demographic and employee health
factors—such as age, gender, and smoker status (experience rating el-
ements).48  With medical underwriting, another plan option for small
employers, insurers determine premium rates based on the health sta-
tuses of employees and their covered family members; states have in-
jected solidarity ideals of community rating into medical underwriting
through a regulatory control mechanism called rating bands.49  Simi-
larly, insurers medically underwrite large employer groups based on
the level of employee participation (but not their health statuses) and
prior claims history of the group.50  So for large and small employers
alike, groups with greater health risks and claim rates pay more, col-
lectively, than groups with lower risks and claim rates, but all mem-
bers of a group typically pay the same premium rates into the
collective insurance pool.51  These hybrid rating systems group people
together (whether by employer or by exchange) and insurers estimate
the medical expenses that will be incurred by the group at large,
rather than specific individuals’ medical costs.52  Insurers then charge
the whole group a particular amount for coverage and that amount is
47. In an experience rating system, insurance premium costs are set based on actua-
rial assessments of demographics (such as age, sex, and geographic location), past
claims history, specific risks of a particular type of employment (such as construc-
tion work or logging), and health status factors of particular individuals.  For a
general description of the distinctions between community rating and experience
rating, see STARR, supra note 4, at 329–31. R
48. See NAHU, supra note 46.
49. Id.; see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POLICY AND RESEARCH, RATE
REGULATION (2011), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_health_
insurance_rate_regulation_brief.pdf.  Under rating band regulation, a particular
group’s premium rates may not vary by more than a specified percentage of the
average small group premium rate. Id. For example, if the average small group
rate is $100 per month and the rating band is plus or minus 25%, then any small
group’s rate may be as low as $75 per month or as high as $125 per month.
50. NAHU, supra note 46.
51. See, e.g., Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and Sustainable Individual
Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 HEALTH AFF. 167, 168 (2004); Wendy
K. Zellers et al., Small-Business Health Insurance: Only the Healthy Need Apply,
11 HEALTH AFF. 174, 174–75, 177 (1992).  Interestingly, other factors might also
contribute to higher costs for particular groups.  Lawyers and physicians, for ex-
ample, might pay more or be excluded from certain health plans entirely because,
as groups, they are too litigious and have high utilization rates, respectively.
Zellers et al., supra, at 176–77.  Cost differentials are even more exaggerated in a
pure experience rating system. See AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 6. R
52. See, e.g., AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 11, 17–18; Uwe E. Reinhardt, R
Is ‘Community Rating’ in Health Insurance Fair?, ECONOMIX (Jan. 1, 2010, 7:01
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divided—usually equally—among all of the group members (i.e., the
employees or HIE purchasers) such that each member pays the same
health insurance premium, consistent with the communitarian
model.53
Perhaps not surprisingly, the communitarian model can be polariz-
ing.  Some argue that community rating systems are unfair because
low-risk individuals pay more than their proportional share of the pre-
miums, while high-risk individuals pay too little.54  Others argue that
this model represents the essence of a communal society—or, at least,
what that essence should be.  Professor Deborah Stone described this
essence as the “solidarity principle,” meaning that as a collective soci-
ety, “we should not abandon those who are sick or attached in some
way to people who are sick; sick and healthy, we are all one
community.”55
Many things go into the making of community.  Communities share a common
culture and a way of perpetuating it.  They establish processes for governance,
conflict resolution, and self-defense.  Above all, the people in a community
help each other.  Mutual aid among a group of people who see themselves as
sharing common interests is the essence of community; a willingness to help
each other is the glue that holds people together as a society, whether at the
level of a simple peasant community . . . or a modern welfare state.56
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/is-community-rating-in-
health-insurance-fair.
53. AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at 11, 17–18; Reinhardt, supra note 52. R
Employers frequently contribute to the insurance premium costs for their em-
ployees, as a form of compensation. See AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 34, at R
5–6.
54. See, e.g., Monheit et al., supra note 51, at 168; Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for
the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y AND L. 287, 287–88 (1993)
(describing an ad campaign of the late 1980s sponsored by the health and life
insurance trade associations).  This vision commits itself to actuarial fairness and
accuracy, such that people pay for what they use. See Stone, supra, at 288–89.
55. Stone, supra note 54, at 289.
56. Id.  A variety of other countries operate health care systems consistent with the
solidarity principle.  Uwe E. Reinhardt, How the World Balances Health Care
Risk, ECONOMIX (Jan. 8, 2010, 7:07 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
01/08/how-the-world-balances-health-care-risk.  Switzerland, the Netherlands,
and Germany all maintain community rating with widespread popular accept-
ance—even societal expectation—and all three countries offer their citizens an
array of private health insurers (not governmentally operated) from which to
choose. Id.  Similar systems operate in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and numerous other countries. Id.  According to Professor Uwe Reinhardt, these
community rating systems continue because “[t]he vast majority of citizens in
these countries view health care as a ‘social good’ that is to be shared on the basis
of need by all on roughly equal terms and is to be financed largely on the basis of
ability to pay.” Id.  Professor Reinhardt is the James Madison Professor of Politi-
cal Economy and Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton Univer-
sity. Uwe E. Reinhardt, PRINCETON UNIV., http://www.princeton.edu/~reinhard/
(last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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As described above, the underlying solidarity sentiment of commu-
nity rating maintains a certain presence in today’s U.S. health care
financing.57  At the turn of the millennium, more than half of Ameri-
cans supported collective responsibility for medical care.58  Numerous
scholars have analyzed, critiqued, and evaluated the extent to which
the solidarity principle should be applied to the American health care
system and the bounds of American distributive health justice.59  The
existence of this scholarly discourse demonstrates that the communi-
tarian health care model persists in the U.S.  The creation of the
HIEs, pursuant to the ACA,60 evidences a continued commitment to
these communitarian principles.  In general, for more than half of
non-elderly Americans who purchase insurance through their employ-
ers, the insurer assesses the collective risk and determines a total pre-
mium amount, and the employer determines how much of that
premium it will pay on behalf of each employee as part of the compen-
sation package with the remainder of the costs divided evenly among
its employees.61  Americans participate in a solidarity-type system,
57. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Adam, Martin and John: Iconography, Infrastructure,
and America’s Pathological Inconsistency About Medical Insurance, 14 CONN. INS.
L.J. 229, 260–61 (2008); see also Note, Universal Access to Health Care, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1323, 1328–30, 1336–39 (1995) (describing communitarian theory and ap-
plying that theory to the U.S. health care system).
58. See Madison et al., supra note 29, at 454 (“[A] national poll found that more peo- R
ple think it is unfair (42%) than fair (37%) ‘to ask people with unhealthy lifestyles
to pay higher insurance premiums than people with healthy lifestyles.’”); Mark
Schlesinger, Reprivatizing the Public Household?  Medical Care in the Context of
American Public Values, 29 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 969 passim (2004).
59. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008);
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); NORMAN DANIELS, SEEKING FAIR
TREATMENT: FROM THE AIDS EPIDEMIC TO NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
(1995); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1997); IN SEARCH OF EQUITY: HEALTH NEEDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYS-
TEM (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 1983); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed.
1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 168–76 (2003); Lois
Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 108, 131–35 (1996); Norman Daniels et al., Benchmarks of Fairness
for Health Care Reform, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (1996), www.who.int/bulletin/
archives/78(6)740.pdf;.
60. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2201, 124
Stat. 119, 289 (2010).
61. Some employer-sponsored health insurance plans, such as the one for the Univer-
sity of California, take a slightly different approach and differentiate premium
amounts based on salary. See, e.g., Information for UC Employees Regarding
UC’s 2007 Medical Plan Bid Process, UNIV. OF CAL., http://atyourservice.ucop.
edu/news/health/2007_medical_bid.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (noting that
the University of California will “continu[e] its salary-based approach to monthly
premiums, which . . . means lower-paid workers pay lower monthly premiums
and continue to have access to quality health insurance for themselves and their
families”).  This premium distinction arguably fits into the communitarian model
even more so than the flat rate model because it attempts to make access to
health care equitable across class lines.
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consistent with the communitarian model, which relies on collective
contributions and distributions to those who need.
B. An Anti-Communitarian Development: Health Insurance
Fat Taxes
Recently, however, employers began shirking away from communi-
tarian and solidarity principles by charging certain employees uneven
shares of their group insurance premiums or otherwise increasing the
cost of health care for people who fail to meet certain health status
benchmarks, which failures cause overall insurance costs to rise.62
Fatness is one such health factor that can drive up the collective cost
of insurance.63  To reduce their share of increased health insurance
premiums, and to avoid charging thin people more money in a tight
economy, some employers now shift the additional fatness costs onto
the fat employees through health insurance fat taxes.64  These health
insurance fat taxes represent a serious shift away from a solidarity,
communitarian model.
Though the concept is relatively new, implementing these health
insurance fat taxes may be an increasing trend among employers who
sponsor health insurance plans.65  Evidence of this trend can be found
among both public and private employers.66
1. The Alabama Program
The Alabama State Employees’ Insurance Board (SEIB) made na-
tional news when it approved its “Wellness Premium Discount Pro-
gram” in 2008 (the Alabama Program).67  Through the end of fiscal
year 2009, non-smoker state employees in Alabama received free
health insurance as part of their employee benefits package.68  Begin-
62. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Could Health Overhaul Incentives Hurt Some?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/
health/13land.html.
63. Fatness is said to add $90 billion to health care costs each year.  Elizabeth
Kolbert, XXXL: Why Are We So Fat?, THE NEW YORKER 73, 76–77 (July 20, 2009),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2009/07/20/090720crbo
_books_kolbert?currentPage=all.
64. See supra note 4 (discussing the use of the term “tax” in this context). R
65. Notably, most employers fall into this category, especially after the advent of the
ACA, and likely this will remain so, particularly if the ACA withstands Constitu-
tional scrutiny. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. Cf. ACA, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 120 (2010).
66. See infra subsections II.B.1–II.B.3.
67. See, e.g., Associated Press, Alabama workers to pay extra for pounds,
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 21 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26337794.
68. State Employees’ Health Insurance Plan: Approved Premium and Benefit
Changes, ALA. ST. EMPS.’ INS. BOARD. (2009) [hereinafter Approved Premium and
Benefit Changes], http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIPFY2010RateChange.pdf.
Employees and retirees who smoke or use other tobacco products have been sub-
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ning in fiscal year 2010, however, with the implementation of the new
Alabama Program, all state employees pay a minimum flat fee of
$15.00 per month, which amount increases to $40.00 (representing a
267% increase) if the employees fail to achieve certain health markers
indicating “wellness.”69  Health risk factors include, among other
things, BMI of 35 or higher.70  Worksite health screening results from
2009 indicate that of the 35,716 employees screened that year, nearly
22% fall into the BMI risk group.71  In other words, more than one in
five Alabama state workers are deemed at risk because of their fat-
ness.  This risk group is nearly double the number of employees falling
into all of the other risk groups combined, indicating the Program’s
obvious target.72
To remain eligible for the so-called “discount” under the Alabama
Program, a state employee with a BMI of 35 or higher73 must partici-
pate in a weight reduction program such as Weight Watchers, lose
weight on their own, or provide a note from a physician indicating that
the employee has a medical condition that precludes weight loss.74
The state does not charge variable insurance premium rates based on
ject to a health insurance surcharge since October 1, 2005. See ALA. CODE § 36-
29-19.3 (2001).  William Ashmore, the SEIB Chief Executive Officer, attributes
the mandatory smoker surcharge to the fact that smoking or other tobacco use is
a lifestyle choice.  According to Ashmore, “ ‘[y]ou either smoke or you don’t, and if
you smoke, you will pay . . . .’ ”  Paul Gallagher, Heavy Attention on Alabama
Plan, HUMAN RES. EXEC. ONLINE (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/
printstory.jsp?storyId=124846138.
69. Approved Premium and Benefit Changes, supra note 68.
70. Ala. State Emps.’ Ins. Bd., Wellness Premium Discount Program, HEALTH WATCH
3 (Jan./Feb. 2011) [hereinafter HEALTH WATCH], http://www.alseib.org/PDF/
SEHIP/HWJan2011.pdf.  Other risk factors include high levels of cholesterol, glu-
cose, and blood pressure. Id.
71. State Employees’ Health Insurance Plan: Worksite Wellness Screening Results,
ALA. ST. EMPS.’ INS. BOARD. 3, 5 (2009), http://www.alseib.org/PDF/Wellness
ScreeningResultsPresentation.pdf.
72. See id. at 5.  The wellness screening results do not provide information about any
overlap between the individuals at risk in the BMI category and the individuals
at risk in the other categories. See id. Stated otherwise, individuals may be
double-counted if they fall into multiple risk groups.
73. Employees can calculate their BMIs by entering their heights and weights at the
SEIB website, http://www.alseib.org/Healthinsurance/sehip/BMICalculator.aspx.
A person who is 5 feet, 4 inches tall crosses the threshold into “overweight” at 146
pounds, which yields a BMI of 25.11.  This person becomes “obese” at 175 pounds
(BMI = 30.11), and “morbidly obese” at 204 pounds (BMI = 35.09).  This person is
“underweight” at 109 pounds (BMI = 18.5), but there are no insurance penalties
for individuals who are underweight.
74. State of Alabama: Wellness Premium Discount Program, ALA. ST. EMPS.’ INS.
BOARD § II, available at http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/SEHIPWellness
PremiumDiscount.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2011); HEALTH WATCH, supra note 70.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB402.txt unknown Seq: 14 15-MAY-12 13:59
2012] HEALTH COVER(AGE)ING 933
the health statuses of employees’ dependents who are covered by the
same health insurance system.75
Media coverage of the Alabama Program bifurcated into two main
camps.  Several articles and editorials cited by the SEIB hail the Ala-
bama Program as a voluntary discount program through which the
state seeks to improve the health of its employees—an issue of partic-
ular importance in a state ranked as one of the fattest in the nation.76
Conversely, many articles and editorials, including some of those cited
by the SEIB on its website, call the Alabama Program a penalty pay-
ment based on weight, or more bluntly, a health insurance fat tax.77
As one columnist stated, “Big Brother has been watching and has
grown weary of the proverbial carrot incentives.  So, here comes the
punishing stick. . . .  Those in charge want citizens to step up to the
plate and take personal responsibility for their fatness—or pay for the
privilege to be pudgy.”78  She recounts the Alabama Program in a
rather succinct, candid fashion: “Alabama recently gave its 37,527
overweight government employees a year to slim down and shape up
or be prepared to fork over [an extra] $25 a month for health insur-
ance . . . .”79
75. Ala. State Emps.’ Ins. Bd., State Employees Want to Know, HEALTH WATCH 2
(Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/HWOct2008.pdf; HEALTH
WATCH, supra note 70.
76. See, e.g., Articles on the Wellness Premium Discount Program, ALA. ST. EMPS.’
INS. BOARD, https://www.alseib.org/Information/Media/Articles.aspx (last visited
Mar. 5, 2011); see also JEFFREY LEVI ET AL., TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, F AS IN
FAT: HOW OBESITY POLICIES ARE FAILING IN AMERICA (2008), http://healthyameri
cans.org/reports/obesity2008/Obesity2008Report.pdf (tracking trends in obesity-
related rates and policies in the United States).
77. See Erin Anderssen, Fighting Obesity: The Wrong Way vs. The Right Way, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (CANADA), Jan. 15, 2011, at F1 (“Alabama decided that its state
employees should pay a $25-a-month fat penalty for health insurance that is free
to the thin.”); Don Fernandez, Alabama ‘Obesity Penalty’ Stirs Debate, WEBMD
HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20080825/
alabama-obesity-penalty-stirs-debate; Victoria E. Knight, Alabama to Obese Em-
ployees: Address the Issue, or Pay for Insurance, HEALTH BLOG (Aug. 29, 2008,
4:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/08/29/alabama-to-obese-employees-
address-the-issue-or-pay-for-insurance; Associated Press, supra note 67 (“Ala-
bama will be the first state to charge overweight state workers who don’t work on
slimming down”); Shari Roan, Alabama to place ‘fat tax’ on obese state employees,
BOOSTER SHOTS (Aug. 25, 2008, 3:39 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
booster_shots/2008/08/alabama-places.html; Matt Sloane, Alabama to link pre-
mium costs to workers’ health, CNNHEALTH.COM (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.cnn.
com/2008/HEALTH/diet.fitness/09/19/alabama.obesity.insurance/index.html;
Jana Winter, Alabama Plans to Tax Fat Employees to Recoup Insurance Costs,
FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,414861,00.
html.
78. Kimberly Garrison, Your Choice Could Be: Slim Down or Pay, PHILADELPHIA
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2008, at 35.
79. Id.
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2. The Arizona Proposal
Alabama imposes financial penalties on fat employees who
purchase health insurance through their state employment.  Arizona,
however, plans to impose financial penalties on individuals who can-
not afford to purchase health insurance at all, whether through their
employment or otherwise.  In March 2011, Arizona Governor Jan
Brewer announced her proposal that adult Medicaid beneficiaries
without children be charged $50 per year if they smoke or are fat and
fail to comply with a physician’s weight reduction instructions.80  This
plan, if implemented, would be the first health insurance fat tax pe-
nalizing people for “unhealthy lifestyles” imposed by a government
health care program.81
Governor Brewer trumpets the proposal as an “incentive strateg[y]
that will encourage individuals to take greater control of their
health,”82 but Democratic state Senator Kyrsten Sinema believes the
$50 fee inappropriately penalizes individuals with health conditions
beyond their control, including those who are fat.83  Specifically,
Sinema said that “[t]o fine people for medical conditions that might be
beyond their control, that’s just not right. . . .  This would punish peo-
ple with disabilities who have done nothing wrong.”84  She also stated
that other people who perpetuate unhealthy behaviors, such as drink-
ing sugar-sweetened soda, are not financially penalized for doing so,
but obesity experts and health ethicists claim the proposal might open
the door for penalties associated with other individual choices that
might result in increased medical costs.85  These experts and ethicists
also question whether the penalty proposal will achieve the desired
results of reducing costs and improving individual health.86
80. Janet Adamy, Arizona Proposes Medicaid Fat Fee, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at
A3; Mark Carlson, Arizona Medicaid Considers Tax On Smokers, Obese, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=13276359; Ben
Forer, Arizona Governor Proposes Revamping Medicaid Program, ABC NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/arizona-gov-jan-brewer-proposes-
medicare-fat-fine/story?id=13274368.  Medicaid beneficiaries with chronic ill-
nesses who fail to follow health plans designed by their physicians will also be
subject to the $50 penalty fee.  Forer, supra.
81. Carlson, supra note 80.
82. Forer, supra note 80; see Timothy Williams, Under an Arizona Plan, Smokers and
the Obese Would Pay Medicaid Fee, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2011, at A16.
83. Forer, supra note 80.
84. Id.  Sinema’s comments may have been directed only at individuals with diabetes
who might also be subject to the penalty fee.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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3. Programs in Corporate America
According to a 2010 Hewitt Associates survey, nearly half of large
scale employers have aligned their thinking with Arizona and are not
far behind Alabama.87  Specifically, 47% (up from only 7% in 2009,
representing a substantial increase in percentage) of the large employ-
ers surveyed said that by 2015, they intend to target fatness by impos-
ing financial penalties on employees who fail to participate in health
improvement programs or offering financial incentives for those who
maintain “healthy”88 weights.89  The most popular form of penalty is a
higher premium payment, favored by 81% of employers surveyed.90
Nearly 20% of the employers have already implemented, or plan to
implement, penalties in the form of higher deductibles and other out-
of-pocket health expenses.91  A Fidelity Investments survey released
in early 2011 noted a sharp uptick in employer use of incentives,
rather than penalties, to encourage weight loss.92  Such incentives are
designed to increase employee participation and are believed to have
greater rates of long-term success.93
Some well-known large employers have already implemented these
incentive-type programs.  American Express, for example, offers $100
to employees for participating in a health survey and free health
screening checks, which efforts have led to employee weight loss.94
Whole Foods took a slightly different approach, offering voluntary
health screenings to its employees and fatter in-store purchase dis-
counts to thinner employees.95  All Whole Foods employees receive a
20% store discount, but the Team Member Healthy Discount Incentive
Program offers an “opportunity” for employees to “increase” that dis-
87. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, THE ROAD AHEAD: UNDER CONSTRUCTION WITH INCREASING
TOLLS 11, 13–18 (2010), http://www.aon.com/attachments/thought-leadership/
Hewitt_Survey_Findings_TheRoadAhead_2010.pdf; see Hewitt Survey Shows
Growing Interest Among U.S. Employers to Penalize Workers for Unhealthy Be-
haviors, ENHANCED ONLINE NEWS (Mar. 17, 2010) [hereinafter EON], http://eon.
businesswire.com/news/eon/20100317005918/en.
88. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
89. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, supra note 87, at 18; EON, supra note 87.
90. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, supra note 87, at 18.
91. Id.
92. Annual Wellness Study Finds Significant Jump in Incentive Dollars as Employ-
ers Report Improved Employee Participation, FIDELITY.COM (Feb. 8, 2011) [herein-
after Annual Wellness Study], http://www.fidelity.com/inside-fidelity/employer-
services/2011-wellness-survey; Katherine Hobson, Employers Increased Wellness
Incentives Last Year, HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 8, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
health/2011/02/08/employers-increased-wellness-incentives-last-year.
93. Annual Wellness Study, supra note 92; Hobson, supra note 92.
94. Rabin, supra note 62.
95. Edgar Sandoval & Kathleen Lucadamo, Whole Foods to give greater employee dis-
counts to workers with lower BMI, cholesterol, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2010), http://
articles.nydailynews.com/2010-01-26/entertainment/29436953_1_discounts-free-
health-screenings-chelsea-store.
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count to as much as 30%.96  Specifically, employees who participate in
the screening are assigned to one of four categories—bronze, silver,
gold, or platinum—based in large part on their BMI.97  Employees
must meet certain BMI benchmarks to reach any of the discount cate-
gories: for bronze, BMI must be less than 30; for silver, less than 28;
for gold, less than 26; and for platinum, BMI must be less than 24.98
Notably, the upper range of the “normal” weight category defined by
the CDC is BMI 24.9,99 nearly a full point on the scale above the plati-
num limit set by Whole Foods.  John Mackey, the Whole Foods CEO,
touted the Program as a new way of providing “incentives to en-
courage our Team Members to be healthier and to lower our health-
care costs.  We believe this is a win-win program that will help both
our Team Members and our shareholders.”100  Mackey’s concern, and
the goal of the Whole Foods Program, notably focuses on reducing cor-
porate healthcare costs and “help[ing]” shareholders retain higher
profits.
Critics of the Whole Foods Program, including the National Associ-
ation to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) and several consumers,
call the Program “discrimination” and believe it is nothing more than
a judgment based on appearance.101  In particular, the use of BMI as a
health indicator drew criticism from experts in the field, including Dr.
Kevin Volpp, director of the Center for Health Incentives at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, and Joseph Newhouse, an economist at
Harvard Medical School in the department of health care policy.102
These experts stated a few overarching concerns about the use of BMI
in the incentive program: (1) distinctions between the BMI ranges
listed for each of the discount categories are too small to have a signifi-
cant impact on overall health; (2) the discounts only incentivize
change for people who find it easy to lose weight; (3) BMI is a tool used
to measure populations, not individuals, and can be misleading when
96. Letter from John Mackey, Chief Exec. Officer, Whole Foods, Inc., to all Whole
Foods employees (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter Mackey Letter], http://cache.gawker.
com/assets/images/39/2010/01/healthy_discount_letter_01.jpg.
97. Attention Team Members!, WHOLE FOODS MKT., http://cache.gawker.com/assets/
images/39/2010/01/healthy_discount_poster_01.jpg (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
98. Id.
99. About BMI for Adults, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/index.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2011).
100. Mackey Letter, supra note 96.
101. Sandoval & Lucadamo, supra note 95.
102. Joseph Brownstein, Is Whole Foods’ Get Healthy Plan Fair?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/w_DietAndFitnessNews/foods-incentives-
make-employees-healthier/story?id=9680047&page=1.
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applied on an individual level; and (4) BMI is not necessarily a good
indicator of overall health.103
III. FACTS OF FATNESS
Not only do health insurance fat taxes detract from the communi-
tarian health care model, but they do so based on an imperfect classifi-
cation system.  The scientific community disagrees about what results
from fatness, what initially creates fatness, and how to measure fat-
ness effectively.  This Part provides critiques of the BMI scale used to
designate who pays health insurance fat taxes, as well as the medical-
ized construction of fatness itself as a disease.  Further, this Part as-
sesses the utility of emphasizing science as justification for health
insurance fat tax regimes.
A. Weighing the Body Mass Index
BMI may still reign in the U.S. as a measure of weight and health,
but as Dr. Volpp and Mr. Newhouse indicated, this scale is not above
critique or skepticism.104  The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) tout
BMI as the method of identifying a “healthy” weight,105 but the initial
103. Id.; see Dominic Lawson, Don’t believe obesity figures—they’re spun for a reason,
INDEP., Aug. 29, 2008, at 26, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/
commentators/dominic-lawson/dominic-lawson-dont-believe-obesity-figures-
ndash-theyre-spun-for-a-purpose-912216.html.  Lawson stated the following:
More pertinently for us all, there is nothing wrong, or even un-
healthy, in being obese, at least as defined by the official measurement
known as the Body Mass Index. . . .  [O]n current BMI definitions George
Clooney and Russell Crowe are clinically ‘obese’ while Brad Pitt and Mel
Gibson are ‘overweight.’  Meanwhile another doctor friend of mine points
out that many of his anorexic patients would be classified as very
healthy according to most conventional measurements, such as blood
pressure; but clearly their attitude to food is anything but healthy.
Lawson, supra.
104. Brownstein, supra note 102.
105. Assessing Your Weight, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
Specifically, the CDC website states as follows:
BMI is a reliable indicator of body fatness.  It is calculated based on your
height and weight.
. . . .
“Underweight”, “normal”, “overweight”, and “obese” are all labels for
ranges of weight.  Obese and overweight describe ranges of weight that
are greater than what is considered healthy for a given height, while
underweight is lower than what is considered healthy.  If your BMI falls
outside of the “normal” or Healthy Weight range, you may want to talk
to your doctor or health care provider about how you might achieve a
healthier body weight.  Obesity and overweight have been shown to in-
crease the likelihood of certain diseases and other health problems.
Id.
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origin of BMI had nothing to do with health.106  Further, the lines of
demarcation between the various weight categories identified through
BMI have not been fixed over time.107  Similarly, the specific BMI
number that arguably indicates whether a person is at greater risk for
disease varies depending on the particular disease at issue.108  In ad-
dition, BMI fails to account for the locus of fat within the body or the
ratio of fat to muscle mass.109  Each of these critiques should, at least
in theory, chip away at the veracity and ultimate utility of BMI.
Perhaps surprisingly, what is known today as BMI can be traced
back to an early nineteenth century survey of the physical characteris-
tics of army recruits, which survey had absolutely nothing to do with
health status.110  A Belgian astronomer, Adolphe Quetelet, sought to
investigate the applicability of mathematical laws of probability to
human beings, relying on body measurements of certain members of
the French and Scottish armies.111  Quetelet plotted his data points
and generated a bell curve of weights relative to height, from which he
identified the center of curve as the range of “normal” weight.112  He
also noticed that the normal weight range centered on the height mea-
surement squared.113  With these calculations in hand, Quetelet theo-
rized that people whose weights did not conform to this measurement
of normalcy were more likely to be criminals or other troublemakers
that required institutionalization, monitoring, or some other form of
social control.114  In sum, fatness equaled deviance.115  Notably,
though, that deviance was Quetelet’s theoretical construction, not a
health status indicator.116
In fact, body mass was a rather poor social classification tool, par-
ticularly because so many people in the nineteenth century struggled
106. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 16–18. R
107. Id. at 22; NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS 1 (1998)
[hereinafter CLINICAL GUIDELINES], http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/
ob_gdlns.pdf.
108. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 26. R
109. See About BMI for Adults, supra note 99.
110. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 16–17. R
111. Id.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 17–18.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Socially constructed deviance based on physiological characteristics continued
into the twentieth century, creating what some call the “golden era of classifica-
tion.” Id. at 18.  Under the guise of science, researchers measured skulls, body
proportions, and other such physical features to segregate society into a caste
system of sorts that, of course, consistently set the white aristocratic elite as the
height of normalcy and everyone else as lowlife delinquents and criminals. See
id.
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to find sufficient food and nutrition.117  Fatness was a sign of wealth;
people wanted to be fat to establish their membership in the social
elite.118  Later in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries,
food became less scarce, so fatness lost its prestige and thin became
chic.119  Medicine then shifted its opinion from supporting plumpness
to advocating for weight loss.120  Shortly thereafter, in the mid-1940s,
the life insurance industry also supported this new trend, and Metro-
politan Life Insurance (Met Life) developed standardized tables that
correlated weight and mortality, modeled, in part, on Quetelet’s bell
curve.121  Today’s BMI122 grew out of these Met Life tables, which
used weight as an indicator of early mortality largely because it was
easily measured, not because any causality had been established be-
tween fat and death.123
Indeed, a notable distinction exists between predicting the likeli-
hood of death based on BMI, which was the goal for Met Life, and
establishing causality between increased BMI and increased mortality
rates.  Experts from the CDC looking at the same time period and sim-
ilar data sets flatly disagreed about the link between fatness and mor-
tality.  An article published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA) claimed that in 2000, fatness caused at least
400,000 deaths.124  The researchers stated that of all the causes of
death analyzed in their report, this was “[t]he most striking find-
ing.”125  Less than a year later, JAMA printed a correction notice stat-
ing that “there were multiple errors in reported data,” which errors
included a reduction in the number of deaths caused by fatness from
400,000 to 365,000.126  Just a few months after the correction, a differ-
ent set of CDC experts reported that only 111,909 excess deaths in
117. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 18; Laura Fraser, The Inner Corset: A Brief History of R
Fat in the United States, in THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, 11–12. R
118. Fraser, supra note 117, at 12.
119. See, e.g., id. at 12–13.
120. Id. at 13.
121. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 19.  Louis Dublin, a Met Life statistician, charted the R
death rates of Met Life’s policyholders according to a height-weight ratio. Id.
122. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) website states that BMI has four weight
ranges: “underweight” (BMI is less than 18.5), “normal” (BMI is 18.5 to 24.9),
“overweight” (BMI is 25.0 to 29.9), and “obese” (BMI is 30.0 or higher). Assessing
Your Weight, supra note 105.  A fifth range (or perhaps a subset of “obese”)
known as “morbidly obese” (BMI is 40.0 or higher) is used to classify the largest
members of American society. See, e.g., OLIVER, supra note 1, at 55–56. R
123. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 19.
124. Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1238, 1238–40 (2004).
125. Id.
126. Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000—Correction, 293 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 298 (2005).
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2000 were linked to obesity.127  Further, individuals falling into the
“overweight” category (BMI 25–29.9) had lower mortality rates than
those in the “normal” category (BMI 18–24.9).128  It appears all that
can be concluded from this is that the relationship between body fat,
health, and death is more complicated than the medical community
might currently understand.129
Similarly, although several studies have attempted to show that a
plethora of diseases (including diabetes, hypertension, coronary artery
disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, and certain types
of cancers) are associated with fatness,130 these studies can be viewed
as methodologically deficient.131  Nearly all of these studies consist of
population surveys rather than results of controlled experiments.132
Also, many do not take into account other possible health factors that
might influence disease susceptibility and development.133  Most no-
tably, no single point on the BMI scale can be identified as the point at
which the risk for diseases increases in a statistically significant
way.134  Public health officials, over time, have even disagreed on the
numeric distinctions between the BMI categories.135  In 1998, to
match BMI classifications maintained by the World Health Organiza-
tion, the CDC, NIH, and other U.S. public health officials lowered the
upper threshold for the “normal” category to 25, down from 27.8 for
men and 27.3 for women.136  In essence, with this decrease, over 37
million Americans became fat overnight, even though their weights
remained constant.137  If BMI was such a powerful weight measure-
ment and health indicator tool, it seems such a basic thing as the
scaled numeric indicators of fatness should be discernable through
medical evidence and analysis; instead, the changes have been based
on politicking and no particular BMI point has been identified as the
marker of increased health risk.138
A 2008 analysis from The Journal of Clinical Epidemiology demon-
strated that BMI is the poorest indicator of cardiovascular health, and
that waist measurement is a better method of evaluating health condi-
127. Flegal et al., supra note 24, at 1863.  See supra note 105 for a description of the R
various BMI categories.
128. Flegal et al., supra note 24, at 1863–64. R
129. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 34. R
130. Id. at 25–27.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 26.
133. Id. at 27.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 22; CLINICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 1.
136. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 22. R
137. Id. at 22.
138. See id. at 22–29.
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tions and risks for hypertension, diabetes, and high cholesterol.139
According to a similar study from Harvard Medical School, even wo-
men falling into the “normal” weight category using BMI are twice as
likely to die early from heart disease or cancer if their waists are too
large.140  Simply stated, a person’s waist measurement should be less
than half of that person’s height.141
When Japan began managing fat, it adopted the waist measure-
ment strategy.142  At least as early as 2005, the Japanese health ob-
session was metabolic syndrome—metaborikku shindoromu, or
“metabo” for short.143  Metabo is essentially the existence of a set of
factors that, in combination with each other, increase the risk of heart
attack, stroke, diabetes, dementia, and even incontinence.144  Japa-
nese individuals are diagnosed with metabo if their waist measure-
ment exceeds nationally prescribed limits (33.5 inches for men and
35.4 inches for women) and they have at least two of the other four
risk factors: high blood pressure, high blood glucose, high cholesterol,
and smoking.145
In April 2008, the Japanese government implemented the “Metabo
Law” expressly setting maximum waist measurements for all of its
citizens aged forty to seventy-four.146  Anyone who exceeds the limits
may be forced to receive dieting guidance and “re-education” about nu-
trition and healthy weights.147  Companies and local governments are
responsible not only for conducting the measurement evaluations, but
also for achieving a 10% reduction in their overweight populations by
2012 and a 25% reduction by 2015, and failure to achieve these targets
will result in financial penalties.148
139. See Tara Parker-Pope, WAIST; Watch Your Girth, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2008),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE7D7153CF930A25756C0
A96E9C8B63.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Rebecca Palmer, Western Ways Hit Japanese Waists, DOMINION POST (Wellington,
New Zealand), Dec. 27, 2008, at 17.
143. Id.
144. See David Nakamura, In Japan, the Fat Police Patrol for Overweight Workers,
STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 28, 2009, at 2; Palmer, supra note 142; Parker-Pope, supra
note 139.
145. Norimitsu Onishi, Japan, Seeking Trim Waists, Decides to Measure Millions,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/world/asia/13fat.
html?pagewanted=all; Palmer, supra note 142; see also Ann Endo, To Your
Health—Jigsaw puzzle diagnosis: The pieces that fit metabolic syndrome, DAILY
YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 19, 2007, at 23 (describing how Japan follows the Interna-
tional Diabetes Federation standard for diagnosing metabo, juxtaposed against
the standard set by the U.S. National Cholesterol Education Program, with the
latter being touted as the “most widely accepted” set of criteria).
146. Onishi, supra note 145; Palmer, supra note 142.
147. Lawson, supra note 103; Onishi, supra note 145.
148. Onishi, supra note 145; Palmer, supra note 142.
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The Japanese government hails the Metabo Law as a method to
rein in rapidly expanding health care costs in a country where most
citizens are covered through public health care or their employers.149
Critics of the Metabo Law, however, claim that the measurement
maximums are too strict, likely resulting in numerous missed targets
and thus serving as a thinly veiled method of shifting health care costs
off the government and onto private employers.150  For example, Ja-
pan’s largest producer of personal computers estimates that it could
incur up to $19 million in penalty fees for failing to achieve its Metabo
Law targets.151  Critics also state that the Japanese are thin enough
and should not lose weight, that a bigger problem not addressed by
the Metabo Law is that of underweight young girls, and that smoking
(another risk factor) should be the Law’s focus instead of fatness.152
Further, critics disparage the waist measurement system as “crude”
due to inconsistent measurement standards; one study shows that
doctors’ measurements for the same patient’s waist can vary as much
as three inches.153
Critics aside, the middle-aged Japanese population must now con-
tend with the Metabo Law.  Some rush to comply, buying exercise
equipment and popping herbal fat remedy pills in an attempt to avoid
the shame associated with fatness, the label as “an unacceptable bur-
den” on national health care costs, and the perceived lack of respect
for, and responsibility to, Japanese society.154  Others, however, sim-
ply ignore it, claiming that their waistlines are none of the govern-
ment’s business.155  Perhaps the dissidents have the best approach;
the media identified at least one woman who went on a crash diet,
eating only vegetable soup, and exercised daily for three weeks before
her measurement, only to revert to eating pasta and drinking beer
once she came in under the limit.156  That hardly seems like an effec-
tive or healthy weight management system.  More importantly, the
Metabo Law misses the point—while there may be some correlation
between fatness and overall health, correlation does not equal causa-
tion between fat and poor health, and the scientific community still
debates the latter.157
149. Onishi, supra note 145.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Nakamura, supra note 144; Onishi, supra note 145.
153. Nakamura, supra note 144.
154. Id.; Tom Plate, Heavyweight Approach to the Obesity Problem, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Jun. 25, 2008, at 17.
155. Onishi, supra note 145.
156. Nakamura, supra note 144.
157. See supra notes 117–41 and accompanying text (concerning what fatness R
“causes”); see also infra section III.B (concerning what “causes” fatness).
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B. Fatness Medicalized and Vilified
Ask a physician or public health official about fat and the answer
probably centers on disease.  Pose the same question to someone not
directly related to the health, drug, or diet industries and the answer
probably centers on laziness and lack of self-control.  Both views con-
tain some truth,158 but neither fully describes the nature of fatness,
and neither escapes systemic social negativity.
Fatness became a disease through decades of efforts by geneticists,
physicians, the pharmaceutical industry, the diet industry, public
health officials, academic researchers, bariatric surgeons, and others
who stood to benefit from that medicalization.159  A host of financial
opportunities present themselves when fatness is viewed as a condi-
tion that can be treated or cured with a pill or a program.  Diet prod-
ucts and programs gained much popularity in the middle of the
twentieth century, particularly among women, with the help of physi-
cians who prescribed diuretics, amphetamines, and other weight loss
drugs to both children and adults.160  Notably, that uptick in diet
products coincided chronologically with the publication of the Met Life
Table.161
By 1970, 70% of American households used “low-cal” products.162
That same year, Weight Watchers’ profits rose to $8 million.163  Diet
fads continued to grow through the 1970s and 1980s, which time
frame also saw the advent of plastic surgery.164  The 1990s brought
hospital diet centers and “miracle diet pills” like Fen-Phen and Redux,
which boosted diet industry profits in 1996 to more than $30 bil-
lion.165  Approximately 18 million people took Fen-Phen in 1996, as
prescribed by their doctors.166  By 2004, Americans spent $46 billion
158. See, e.g., Kathleen LeBesco, Quest for a Cause: The Fat Gene, The Gay Gene, and
the New Eugenics, in THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at 65, 70–72. R
159. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 6, 29–35, 37–58, 101–15; Lyons, supra note 1, at 76–85. R
160. Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia Angell, Losing Weight—An Ill-Fated New Year’s
Resolution, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 52, 52 (1998); Lyons, supra note 1, at 76. R
161. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 70; supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. R
162. Lyons, supra note 1, at 76. R
163. Id.
164. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 71–72. R
165. Lyons, supra note 1, at 76–78. R
166. Kassirer & Angell, supra note 160, at 53.  The next year, both Fen-Phen and
Redux were recalled because of potentially fatal side effects such as primary pul-
monary hypertension and cardiovascular disease. Id. at 52; Lyons, supra note 1, R
at 76–78.  These two drugs are not the only diet products with serious negative
side effects.  More recently, the FDA approved alli for over-the-counter sales as a
weight loss aid, even though it can lead to “bowel movement changes . . . [that]
may include oily spotting, loose stools, and more frequent stools that may be hard
to control.” Alli Faqs, ALLI, http://www.myalli.com/faq.aspx (click on “safety and
drug interactions” and then click on “is alli safe?”; click on “treatment effects” and
then click on “does alli have any side effects?”) (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).  In
other words, people might become thinner by taking alli, but they also might
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on diet products and programs, exclusive of bariatric and other weight
loss surgeries.167  All of that spending depended directly on a concep-
tion of fatness as a disease that could be cured or remedied with the
appropriate medical intervention.
Public health officials, influenced by diet and health industry lob-
byists, followed a similar pattern of promoting obesity as a disease,
and eventually a disease of epidemic proportion.168  In 1985, the Na-
tional Institute of Health Consensus Conference on Obesity declared
“obesity” to be a “killer disease” in order to obtain insurance coverage
for the raging diet fads and treatments just described.169  In 1994, for-
mer U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop declared a “great crusade”
against fat when he launched the Shape Up America! campaign,170
which campaign was funded by Jenny Craig, Weight Watchers, Slim-
Fast, and other diet industry giants to the tune of up to $1 million
each.171  Shortly thereafter, in 1997, William Dietz left his post at
Tufts University School of Medicine for a new position with the CDC
as a director of the Division for Nutrition and Physical Activity, and
the next year, he and a CDC colleague created the beginnings of a
PowerPoint presentation showing how the obesity disease had become
an epidemic.172  The presentation took hundreds of spreadsheet cells
indicating obesity trends from 1985–1999 and reduced that data to a
series of color-coded maps of the nation showing, by an increase in the
number of red “obese” states (where obesity was defined as a BMI of
30 or more), how much the obesity infection had grown.173  While no
red states existed in 1985, twenty red states appeared on the 1999
map.174  Of course, some of these states are deceptively large, geo-
graphically, when the real measure is population—consider, for exam-
ple, North Dakota.175  Nonetheless, when asked about the impact of
the presentation, Dr. Dietz said that “[t]hese maps have shifted the
have to carry a spare pair of pants, just in case.  For a discussion of diet drugs
that may cause similar side effects, such as bowel leakage and diarrhea, as well
as depression, anxiety, and heart problems, see OLIVER, supra note 1, at 52. R
167. Lyons, supra note 1, at 77.  Notably, bariatric surgery provides another example R
of how the medicalization of fatness promotes the padding of certain pockets.  For
a discussion of bariatric surgery and the profits made by this industry niche, see
OLIVER, supra note 1, at 53–56. R
168. Lyons, supra note 1, at 79. R
169. Id.
170. Dr. C. Everett Koop Launches A New “Crusade” To Combat Obesity in America,
SHAPE UP AMERICA!  (Dec. 6, 1994), http://www.shapeup.org/about/arch_pr/120
694.php); see also Kassirer & Angell, supra note 160 at 53 (discussing the reasons
for the “medical campaign against obesity”).
171. SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 151, 213–14; Lyons, supra note 1, at 79; Solovay & R
Rothblum, Introduction, in THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at 1. R
172. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 39–40. R
173. Id. at 40–41.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 42–43.
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discussion from whether a problem exists to what we should do about
the epidemic.”176  Further, “[n]othing has been more effective at in-
creasing the visibility of the obesity epidemic than the CDC slides.”177
Before accepting his position at the CDC, Dr. Dietz was a paid consult-
ant to Hoffman-La Roche and Knoll Pharmaceuticals—two companies
developing diet drugs.178  He left Tufts for the CDC because he be-
lieved obesity needed to be addressed nationwide, which he thought
he could not accomplish from academia.179
Though Dietz sought a broader audience through a more public
venue, academic researchers also profit from the medicalization of fat-
ness, and thus promote this view to secure grant funding, publish arti-
cles, and become tenured.180  Academics first discovered the “fat gene”
in mice in 1995.181  More research and studies, however, produced evi-
dence that the mouse fat gene did not occur in sufficiently large pro-
portion among fat humans, so it could not truly account for the obesity
epidemic.182  That one fat gene became, through more research ef-
forts, over seventy different gene sets that might determine fat-
ness.183  “While the media often reports discovery of a ‘fat’ gene, this is
far from the case—what they should report is the discovery of one of
many possible fat genes.”184  The more fat genes science discovers, the
more research is needed to explain the genetic codes and try to find a
“cure” to correct the fat “abnormality.”185  The results of that research
can be extremely valuable to the pharmaceutical companies that
stand to generate large profits from the latest and greatest weight loss
pill.186
Perhaps this medicalization should not come as a surprise given
the tendency to medicalize behaviors that do not carry social ap-
proval.187  But, the science that medicalizes also vilifies.  Anti-fat bias
permeates the medical profession.188  Numerous studies show physi-
cians, mental health professionals, and nurses see fat patients as
weak, ugly, awkward, and unworthy of respect.189  One study con-
176. Id. at 42.
177. Id. at 43; see Lyons, supra note 1, at 80. R
178. Lyons, supra note 1, at 79–80. R
179. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 39. R
180. Id. at 45.
181. LeBesco, supra note 158, at 69.
182. Id.
183. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 105. R
184. Id.
185. See generally, LeBesco, supra note 158.
186. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 111–14. R
187. Kassirer & Angell, supra note 160, at 53; see also OLIVER, supra note 1, at 43–44 R
(“Today, it seems that any physical inconvenience, symptom, or correlate of a
health problem has been elevated to the status of a disease.”).
188. SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 218–26. R
189. Id. at 218–19.
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ducted by Tufts University found nurses do not want to even touch fat
patients, let alone provide care.190  Many fat people, particularly wo-
men, avoid seeking medical treatment because of the bias and apathy
for fatness that the medical profession projects.191  This avoidance
holds true even when the underlying condition is serious, such as cer-
vical cancer, and the treatment is intended to address that underlying
condition.192  “Disrespectful and different healthcare treatment, the
result of unchecked bias, creates a legacy of frustration and despair
that completely alienates fat people from the medical care system. . . .
Every participant in [a] survey [of fat patients] had avoided a needed
medical visit, particularly in relation to gynecological care.”193  Ironi-
cally, this alienation comes from a body of professionals who, at least
in theory, are the ones to whom fat people should turn if they want to
change their weight and should understand that fatness is not a crea-
tion of complete autonomy and choice, but rather is a combination of
nature and nurture.194
Indeed, no one truly knows what causes fatness.195  What is
known, however, is that “the simple calories-in, calories-out equation
does not really explain why some people are heavy and some people
are thin because it assumes that both factors are under our immediate
control.”196  Professor Deborah Rhode provides a useful perspective:
Although about two-thirds of surveyed Americans believe that people are fat
because they lack self-control, experts generally agree that weight is not sim-
ply a matter of willpower.  Weight reflects a complex interaction of physiologi-
cal, psychological, socioeconomic, and cultural factors.  Genetically
determined set-points work to keep bodies within a predetermined range; fur-
thermore, when dieters reduce their caloric intake and increase their exercise,
their metabolism slows down to compensate and makes any weight loss diffi-
cult to sustain.  The problems are compounded by sedentary occupations and
‘toxic environments’ that lack recreational opportunities and encourage un-
healthy food choices.197
Despite these complexities, fat people are systematically blamed
for their fatness because society generally maintains that fatness is a
person’s individual responsibility.198  Likewise, “fat people are blamed
for their health problems,”199 such as diabetes, coronary artery dis-
ease, and hypertension, even though medical science disagrees on the
actual causal connection between fatness, on the one hand, and mor-
190. Id. at 219.
191. Id. at 218–23.
192. Id. at 218.
193. Id. at 222–23.
194. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 100–21. R
195. Id.
196. Id. at 101.
197. Rhode, supra note 2, at 1050. R
198. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 100. R
199. Deb Burgard, What Is “Health at Every Size?,” in THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra
note 1, at 42. R
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tality and disease, on the other.200  The systemic blame and stigma
are pervasive, real, and serious; society believes that fat people are
lazy, undisciplined, unfit, dishonest, sloppy, ugly, socially unattrac-
tive, less productive, lacking in self-control, dirty, stupid, and worth-
less.201  These stereotypes are ingrained so deeply that fat individuals
face disparate treatment in schools, in employment, in health care de-
livery, and in the civil and criminal justice systems.202  People, and
particularly women, value thinness so highly that over the past sev-
eral decades, they have tried a variety of diet pills and programs that
in some cases resulted in body mutilation, serious disease, and even
death.203  People did this even though nearly all diets (up to 95%) sim-
ply do not work.204  “[D]iscrimination based on [fatness] unfairly stig-
matizes individuals based on factors that often are at least partly
beyond their control.  That stigma imposes substantial financial and
psychological costs, [and] undermines individuals’ self-esteem . . . .”205
In short, America hates fat, fears becoming fat, and systemically de-
means or wholly rejects the members of society whose size challenges
the normative vision of the thin body.206
C. Misleading Reliance on Science
As demonstrated above, members of the scientific community have
yet to agree on what causes fatness, what fatness causes, or even how
to effectively measure fatness (and, arguably, how to define it, given
the shifting BMI markers).207  Employers nonetheless base their
health insurance fat taxes on the “science” of fatness.208  BMI is used
to identify people who must pay the penalty, relying on the science
indicating that fatness causes disease and/or death (thus increasing
expected health care usage and, accordingly, insurance coverage pre-
miums).209  Similarly, exceptions to the penalties are based on actual
200. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 22–28. R
201. Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 209, 222, 226 (2010); Rhode, supra
note 2, at 1051. R
202. SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 16–17 (health care, education), 47–63 (education), R
86–98 (bias in jury selection), 99–121 (employment), 218–32 (health care and in-
voluntary commitment of fat people); Korn, supra note 201, at 224–29 (employ-
ment and health care); Rhode, supra note 2, at 1049 (education). R
203. See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 1, at 75–77. R
204. Id. at 75; see Glenn Gaesser, Is “Permanent Weight Loss” an Oxymoron?, in THE
FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at 37, 38–39. R
205. Rhode, supra note 2, at 1051 (footnotes omitted); see also Harriet Brown, For R
Obese People, Prejudice in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, at D6, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/16essa.html (discussing overt
prejudices against fat people).
206. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 60–78. R
207. See supra sections III.A–III.B.
208. See supra section II.B.
209. See supra notes 124–141 and accompanying text.
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or attempted weight loss or a physician’s note, relying on the science
indicating that fatness is caused by biology (in the latter case) or, con-
versely, the science indicating that fatness is caused by laziness and
lack of self-control and personal responsibility (in the former case).210
Facially, this scheme seems to cover the realm of possible scientific
bases.
But the scientific reliance is misleading.  Assume, for the moment,
that science could prove fatness causes disease, premature death, and
other health problems, thereby increasing utilization and costs of
health care.  The same can be said for severe thinness.211  However,
thinness is not penalized by health insurance fat taxes.  Now assume
that in addition to establishing what fatness causes, science could also
establish that fatness is caused by individual choice.  People engage in
activities, by choice, that increase their prospective use of health care;
consider rock climbing, motorcycle driving, skydiving, bungee jump-
ing, full contact martial arts, auto racing, hang gliding, and other
thrill-seeking or extreme sports.212  All of these activities drive up life
insurance costs, for example, but have no bearing on health insurance
costs.213  And yet, health insurance fat taxes penalize individuals for
choosing to be fat (or choosing not to be thin) and driving up the pro-
spective costs of health care.  The reason for selecting fatness as a fo-
cus must not, therefore, rely on scientific support for expected health
care expenditures.  Instead, the reason must be anti-fat bias and
stigma.214
[T]he obese elicit blinding rage and disgust in our culture and are often
viewed in terms that suggest an infant sucking hungrily, unconsciously at its
mother’s breast: greedy, self-absorbed, lazy, without self-control or willpower.
People avoid sitting next to the obese (even when the space they take up is not
intrusive); . . . socially, they are considered unacceptable at public functions
(one man wrote to “Dear Abby,” saying that he was planning to replace his
brother and sister-in-law as honor attendants at his wedding, because “they
are both quite overweight”).  Significantly, the part of the obese anatomy most
often targeted for vicious attack, and most despised by the obese themselves,
is the stomach, symbol of consumption . . . .215
210. See supra section III.B.
211. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 41; Flegal et al., supra note 24. R
212. See, e.g., Emmet Pierce, Thrills that freak out insurers, MSN MONEY, http://
money.msn.com/insurance/thrills-that-freak-out-insurers (last visited Jan. 22,
2012).  Arguably, even driving could be added to the list. See Zack McMillin, The
most dangerous activity: driving, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 5, 2010), http://seattle
times.nwsource.com/html/living/2010708175_driving05.html (stating that driv-
ing an automobile is the leading cause of long-term disability, and the leading
cause of deaths among Americans ages one to thirty-four).
213. See Pierce, supra note 212. R
214. See, e.g., SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND
THE BODY 202 (2003); RHODE, supra note 3 passim. R
215. BORDO, supra note 214, at 202 (citation omitted) (referencing MARCIA MILLMAN, R
SUCH A PRETTY FACE: BEING FAT IN AMERICA (1980)).
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Health insurance fat taxes represent a systemic backlash against this
“vicious . . . consumption,” disguised as a method of promoting well-
ness,216 irrespective of medical science.
IV. SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH INSURANCE
FAT TAXES: FAT COVERING
As described in Part III, fatness is not necessarily as purely bad as
commonly believed, nor do health science professionals know the dis-
tinct medical consequences of fatness.  Moreover, science has yet to
determine what causes fatness.  Nonetheless, fatness carries a heavy
social weight—a burden beyond the pounds displayed on the bath-
room scale.217  That burden manifests in several contexts.  One such
context, health insurance fat taxes, forces fat individuals to cover
their fatness by making their body sizes easier for mainstream thin-
ness to overlook.  An examination of social constructions of fatness
and queerness assists the explication of fat covering.
“[F]at is the new gay.”218  Despite the slogan’s flaws,219 the senti-
ment contains certain truths concerning social treatments of fatness
and queerness.220  Scholarship and activism about queerness and fat-
216. See infra section V.B.
217. See, e.g., supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. R
218. Jann Arden, Twitter Post, TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2011), http://twitter.com/jannarden.
219. For commentary on the utility of the similar slogan, “black is the new gay,” see
Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History
in the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-discrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 397, 456 n.312 (2009); Craig J. Konnoth, Note, Created in its
Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in the 1950s–1970s,
119 YALE L.J. 316 (2009); Keith Boykin, Is Gay the new Black?, THE DAILY VOICE
(Dec. 18, 2008), http://thedailyvoice.com/voice/2008/12/is-gay-the-new-black-001
418.php (“Black people still aren’t equal and neither are gays.  It doesn’t help the
gay rights cause to exaggerate the success of the black struggle or to diminish the
success of the LGBT movement.”); LZ Granderson, Commentary: Gay is not the
new black, CNN POLITICS (July 16, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/
07/16/granderson.obama.gays/index.html; Michael J. Gross, Gay Is the New
Black?, ADVOCATE, http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2008/11/16/Gay_
is_the_New_Black_ (last updated July 23, 2009) (“[Gay] oppression, by and large,
is nowhere near as extreme as blacks’, and [gays] insult [blacks] when [gays]
make facile comparisons between our plights.”); Clarence Page, Gay pride, black
prejudice, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-12-07/
news/0812060439_1_gay-marriage-gay-rights-gay-activists (“How about, ‘Gay is
the new gray?’  The gray area for a lot of black Americans like me is not in the
issue of gay rights but in the comparison some gay activists make between that
issue and the movement for racial equality.”); Monique Ruffin, It’s Official: Gay Is
the New Black, HUFF. POST (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
monique-ruffin/gay-civil-rights_b_1168897.html.
220. As a point of fact, studies have shown that lesbians have higher rates of BMIs in
the “overweight” and “obese” categories as compared to straight women.  Bianca
D. M. Wilson, Widening the Dialogue to Narrow the Gap in Health Disparities, in
THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at 54, 55.  One expert observes that these R
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ness represent what Judith Butler has termed “morphological polit-
ics”—collective nonconformist constructions of the body, its
functionalities, its capacities, and its appearances—that challenge
dominant normative visions.221  Certain critical tools that have devel-
oped in these academic and political discourses, exploring queerness
and fatness as loci of contestation of body norms, are instructive in
understanding the operation of those norms and the maintenance of
relevant socially constructed binary schemes.222
First, both queerness and fatness have been constructed on socially
normative binaries.  With regard to the gender binary, consider the
transgender community.  Trans people push normative conceptions of
“male” and “female.”223  Professor Dean Spade notes that although
this binary is mandated and inscribed in several contexts, the distinc-
tiveness of these categories is a legal fiction, and this fiction is particu-
larly problematic for trans people.224  Further, although typical
government identity forms require people to check either the “M” or
“F” box, it is not clear that this distinction actually serves an impor-
tant function or that government systems have reached a consensus
about the proof required to establish one or the other.225  In short, as
Professor Spade posits, government classification systems ubiqui-
tously and invisibly influence and reconfirm the socially constructed,
and falsely polarized, gender binary.226  Moreover, the classification
systems infuse the binary with moral choices and shape the realities
of people whose lives must be described by the classification catego-
studies carry a “fat-is-bad” overtone that transcends fatness to homosexuality.
Id.  While that anti-fat bias perhaps does not fully permeate into lesbian social
systems, the American fat-thin dichotomy is pervasive and smaller social systems
cannot fully shield against the mainstream.  See id. at 60; cf. Rhode, supra note 2, R
at 1057 (discussing how “[s]exualized grooming standards also penalize gays and
lesbians who reject conventional gender norms” as seen in the case of a high
school senior who, as a lesbian who typically wore clothing similar to her male
classmates, refused to abide by her school’s rule that all girls wear scoop-neck
dresses for their yearbook photographs).
221. EXAMINED LIFE: EXCURSIONS WITH CONTEMPORARY THINKERS 200 (Astra Taylor
ed., 2009); accord Kathryn Abrams, Performing Interdependence: Judith Butler
and Sunaura Taylor in The Examined Life, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 474,
483–84 (2011).
222. See, e.g., BORDO, supra note 214; FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE
ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (Martha A. Fineman et al. eds.,
2009); SUSIE ORBACH, FAT IS A FEMINIST ISSUE (1997); Dean Spade, Documenting
Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731 (2008).
223. Spade, supra note 222, at 746. R
224. Id.
225. See id. (“These classification problems reveal the limits of the assumptions about
gender that underlie systems of government data collection and identification.
These assumptions, in turn, match cultural assumptions about gender that most
people understand as non-controversial, obvious, or natural.”).
226. Id. at 744–47 (citing GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS
OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999)).
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ries.227  The “rules related to government gender classification do not
simply discover and describe maleness and femaleness, but instead
produce two populations marked with maleness and femaleness as ef-
fects and objects of governance.”228
Similarly, health insurance fat taxes (re)create two populations
marked with fatness and thinness as objects of employers’ decision-
making, which decision-making process is influenced by economic in-
centives and anti-fat bias.  Thinness is deemed acceptable, regardless
of how a person came to be thin, while fatness is punished.  Fear per-
meates this fat-thin dichotomy, evidenced by widespread fear of be-
coming fat even among thin people (manifested in part by eating
disorders).229  That fear is fueled by the omnipresent negativity asso-
ciated with fatness, leaving fat people with no option but to condemn
their own bodies.  This point is not meant to diminish the flaws in the
creation and perpetuation of both the gender and the body size bina-
ries.  It is important to question why a label as one or the other must
be ascribed at all, particularly when both of these classifications func-
tion so fluidly in people’s lived experiences.
Second, because of their respective academic and political chal-
lenges to normative visions of the body, both queerness and fatness
have been subjected to scientific efforts to “cure” these “diseases.”230
In the mid-1990s, the media exploded with news of both a gay gene
and a fat gene;231 the impetus for such scientific research and excite-
ment about the discoveries must be probed.  While scientific causes of
fatness and queerness might serve as bases for advocacy under ex-
isting legal regimes,232 “science and medicine have long been instru-
mental in oppressing fat and queer people, providing argument after
argument that pathologize the homosexual or ‘obese’ individual . . . .
[P]lacing bodies under the microscope of science, in the name of liberal
projects of self-improvement, in fact reinscribes their deviance and in-
creases their oppression.”233
227. Id. at 744–46.
228. Id. at 747.
229. See BORDO, supra note 214, at 140–41. R
230. See LeBesco, supra note 158, at 65; Yoshino, supra note 12, at 784–86. R
231. LeBesco, supra note 158, at 68.
232. Id. at 70; see also SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 128–64 (discussing disability law as R
it applies to obesity); Jane Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1997) (discussing
fat discrimination and whether obesity should be considered an impairment);
Korn, supra note 201, at 234 (dismissing employment discrimination complaint
because the court found that employer’s decision not to promote plaintiff was
based on appearance, not a belief that plaintiff had a medical disorder); Dylan
Vade & Sondra Solovay, No Apology: Shared Struggles in Fat and Transgender
Law, in THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at 167, 168–74 (discussing fat R
and transgender law).
233. LeBesco, supra note 158, at 70; see also SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 131 (discuss- R
ing whether labeling obesity as a disability is helpful).
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Kathleen LeBesco argues the real reason underlying these scien-
tific efforts to identify genetic causes for fatness and queerness was to
eradicate both from society—a modern-day “new consumer eugenics
movement aimed at abolishing aberrations seemed socially or aes-
thetically undesirable (but far from life threatening).”234  This theory
is not hard to accept, given the diseased historical construction of ho-
mosexuality235 and the hopes and dreams, even today, for a pill to
cure fatness.236
Third, in the absence of effective curative methods, both fatness
and queerness have faced socially constructed fears of contagion.  En-
visioning fatness as an epidemic indicates its viral nature, spreading
through the country like an infection.237  Merely associating with fat
individuals can ascribe fat stigma to thin people,238 and according to
an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, thin people are
more likely to become fat by spending time with fat friends.239  Appar-
ently, fatness is contagious.240  Similarly, after gay advocates finally
succeeded in deleting homosexuality from psychiatric diagnostic
materials, the “contagion model” of queerness emerged, positing that
straight people could be infected with homosexuality through interac-
tions with queer people.241  These contagion models likely arose out of
fear of the socially deviant end result—queerness or fatness.242
Fourth, both identities have been (and in some cases, still are) la-
beled as mutable, grounded in a rhetoric of choice.243  Society resists
accepting that queerness and fatness might be products of both nature
234. LeBesco, supra note 158, at 65.
235. See Yoshino, supra note 12, at 784–803. R
236. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 112–13. R
237. See supra notes 169–179 and accompanying text. R
238. Korn, supra note 201, at 222.
239. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large
Social Network over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 371, 377–78 (2007).
240. See, e.g., Adam R. Pulver, Note, An Imperfect Fit: Obesity, Public Health, and
Disability Antidiscrimination Law, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 387,
406–08 (2008); Gina Kolata, Find Yourself Packing It On? Blame Friends, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/26/
health/26fat.html?pagewanted=all; Sally Squires, A Question From the Edge: Is
Fat Contagious?, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2004, at F1, available at http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35302-2004Aug2.html (describing a scientific
search for a “fat virus”).
241. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 801–02 (citing Paul Cameron & Kirk Cameron, Do R
Homosexual Teachers Pose a Risk to Pupils?, 130 J. PSYCHOL. 603, 611–13
(1996)).
242. Id. at 802 (“[T]he fundamental fear about homosexuality is the apocalyptic ‘fear
of a queer planet,’[ ] the fear that homosexuality can spread without being spread
thin.  [Further,] [b]ecause it so closely tracks popular fears, the contagion model
has proved an extremely effective anti-gay rhetorical device.”).
243. See, e.g., SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 190–95 (fatness); M. Neil Browne et al., R
Obesity as a Protected Category: The Complexity of Personal Responsibility for
Physical Attributes, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 9–10, 39–47 (2010) (fatness);
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and nurture, perhaps due to the normative value of binary
schemes.244  Moreover, the search for or labeling of any cause of
queerness or fatness (biology or choice) perpetuates the new eugenics
project paradigm.245
Fifth, in various ways, society demands that both queerness and
fatness assimilate into the dominant paradigms of straightness and
thinness.  Using homosexuality as an illustrative example, Professor
Yoshino delineates three types of assimilation—converting, passing,
and covering—that have been systematically imposed.246  At first, so-
ciety tried to eradicate homosexuality by converting gays into
straights through the use of hysterectomy, clitoridectomy, vasectomy,
castration, lobotomy, electroshock therapy, hormone treatments, aver-
sion therapy, and psychoanalysis.247  Converting precludes and pro-
hibits the existence of queerness.  Accordingly, Professor Yoshino
posits that conversion casts a moral judgment on its object; it is “not a
value-neutral event, but one that transforms the damned into the
saved; and not a reversible event, but in theory a unique occur-
rence.”248  Professor Yoshino continues:
[C]onversion differs profoundly from either passing or covering.  Passing and
covering are both perceived to be compromise formations in which the under-
lying identity is ostensibly preserved, modified only for popular consumption.
In contrast, conversion is thought to be a more complete embrace or surren-
der.  It is believed to change not only the expression of an identity, but the
underlying substance of it.249
Passing, one of the “compromise” methods, allows for queer people
to exist but not in the public eye.250  Essentially, the passing norm
represents the aspects of society that keep a queer person in the
closet.251  Passing is an assumed possibility for all queer people; if
they wanted to dress straight, act straight, and make up stories about
straight sexual partners, they could probably do so.252  The availabil-
ity of passing does not, however, mean that homophobia ended or even
Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 517–18 (1994) (queerness).
244. See sources cited supra note 243.
245. See supra notes 230–36 and accompanying text.
246. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 772; see supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. R
247. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 784–89; see also id. at 790–803 (providing a history of R
gay conversion).
248. Id. at 786.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 786, 811–27.  Yoshino notes that passing and converting may conflate and
should not be viewed as necessarily or consistently distinct; the same action
might be considered passing and converting depending on the knowledge of the
audience. Id. at 826–27.  Likewise, queerness might not exist, in a way, if it is
not seen by society. Id.
251. Id. at 811–27.
252. Id. at 824–25.
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decreased in severity.253  The distinction in rhetoric might have only
preserved the underlying animus.254  As Professor Yoshino explains,
legal schemes such as the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy evi-
denced this preservation in at least some contexts.255
Covering—the other “compromise” that emerged around the turn
of the millennium—allows for queer individuals to acknowledge their
sexuality both publicly and privately, but concurrently mandates that
sexual orientation be downplayed.256  In other words, queerness can
be acknowledged, but it cannot be flaunted.257  Professor Yoshino
identifies gay marriage as a current example of covering, juxtaposed
against open relationships.258  These types of covering issues cause
conflict within the queer rights movement between those who seek to
establish and maintain similarities with straights (those who adopt
covering and, in this example, support the legalization of gay mar-
riage) and those who embrace differences from straights (those who
resist covering and, in this example, reject the institution of
marriage).259
Applying Professor Yoshino’s theoretical model260 to fatness, it be-
comes apparent that health insurance fat taxes mandate covering.
253. Id. at 825 (citing Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (articulating the “preservation-through-
transformation” concept)).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 827–31.
256. Id. at 838.  As with passing and converting, the same action might be both pass-
ing and covering simultaneously, depending on the audience.  For example, a les-
bian mother acting straight around all of her children’s friends is covering for her
children, but passing to the friends because the friends are unaware of her sexual
orientation. Id. at 772–73, 836–38.
257. Id. at 772–73, 838–42.
258. Id. at 776–77, 847–49.
259. Id. at 839–49.  Yoshino calls these two groups “normals” and “queers,”
respectively:
By normals, I mean a group of people who are openly gay, but who seek
to cover their sexual orientations, emphasizing their commonality with
straights. . . .  By ‘queers,’ I mean a group of people who do not seek to
cover their orientations, choosing instead to embrace their difference
from the mainstream.
Id. at 839.  Further, “normals seek to change gays to accommodate the main-
stream, while ‘queers’ seek to change the mainstream to accommodate gays.  The
main tool of normals in this fight is covering . . . .  Conversely, the main tool of
‘queers’ is the refusal to cover . . . .” Id. at 842.  This Article does not adopt
Yoshino’s terminology because of its use of the terms “queer” and “queerness”
elsewhere, but the concepts are nonetheless conveyed herein.
260. See id. at 773, 778–79, 868–75 (describing the “weak performative model” that
does not trivialize covering, as compared to passing or converting, and allows
space for the intersection of, and fluidity between, nature and nurture vis-a`-vis
the cause of queerness).  In passing, Professor Yoshino states that obesity cannot
find protection under his weak performative model. Id. at 933.  This Article chal-
lenges that conclusion. See infra, Part V.
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Total assimilation through conversion might be the conceptual goal
for fat people,261 given the systemic pressures to annihilate fat by los-
ing weight and staying thin, but health insurance fat taxes do not ne-
cessitate such a result.262  The Alabama Program described above
does not evaluate or track numbers of pounds dropped by fat employ-
ees enrolled in weight loss programs.  Plus, conversion is a relative
impossibility, in light of the extremely high failure rates of dieting.263
Similarly, passing is not possible.  Passing involves hiding the un-
derlying identity component.264  How could a fat person hide the fat,
other than by staying home?  Once a fat person walks outside and
greets the world, fatness is in plain sight.  The public eye might choose
to look away, essentially rendering fat individuals invisible despite
the amount of space they occupy.265  That resultant invisibility, how-
ever, does not negate actual presence.  Fat people exist, undenia-
bly.266  As one scholar observes, “[o]besity, unlike some other
stigmatized conditions such as alcoholism or drug addiction, is appar-
ent to all and impossible to hide.”267  Society cannot force fat people to
pass because they cannot hide their bodies from view.
Covering, the only remaining option, accurately describes the ef-
fects of health insurance fat taxes on fat people.  Simply put, this re-
gime forces fat people whose BMIs are too high (where the line of
demarcation is wholly within the purview of employers’ discretion) to
either take steps to remedy the problem by losing weight, regardless
of whether weight is ever lost, or to conclusively state, with confirma-
tion from a physician, that some biological factor prevents weight loss.
The first option requires an admission that fat individuals should al-
ways strive to change their bodies and convert to thinness, even if that
goal is never reached.  The second option requires an admission of de-
feat by fatness, such that victims are created where perhaps no vic-
tims actually exist.  Although plenty of people can and do lead happy,
261. See Yoshino, supra note 12, at 771 (presenting the view that assimilation cures R
all social evils and thus all people should strive to assimilate).  An argument
could be made that the few individuals who do lose weight and keep it off have
converted, but as discussed herein, such a result is not required.
262. See supra, section II.B.
263. See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 1, at 75–77. R
264. See Yoshino, supra note 11, at 811–27.
265. See, e.g., W. CHARISSE GOODMAN, THE INVISIBLE WOMAN: CONFRONTING WEIGHT
PREJUDICE IN AMERICA x, 1–17 (1995).
266. It would be difficult to argue to the contrary, given the media coverage and other
discourse surrounding the “obesity epidemic” and rising rates of fatness. Cf.
Yoshino, supra note 12, at 840–41 (analyzing the “we’re here, we’re queer, get R
used to it” slogan).
267. Korn, supra note 201, at 221.
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healthy lives with fatness,268 this admission of victimization rein-
forces a systemic vision of fatness that attempts to preclude such lives
from existing.  Both types of admissions make fatness easier for soci-
ety to overlook because fat individuals implicitly and intrinsically ac-
cept (even if under duress) the systemic rhetoric of, and commonplace
adherence to, anti-fat bias and beliefs that fatness is bad and un-
healthy.269  Just as society does, through the regime of health insur-
ance fat taxes, fat people invisibly state that their bodies are flawed,
and, through extension, that their selves are immoral, weak, and
worthless.  This is the essence of systemically mandated covering.270
Further, the effects of covering within the queer rights movement
align with current trends in the fat rights movement.  Professor
Yoshino states that covering divides queer activists who embrace cov-
ering and those who reject it.271  Similarly, some fat rights activists
could be seen as embracing covering while others flatly reject it.  For
example, Marilyn Wann believes America needs a fat revolution, em-
bracing the Health at Every Size model272 and the belief that fat peo-
ple can enjoy good health and long life, while vehemently combating,
among other things, the position that fat people should lose weight
and the vision of fatness as a disease.273  Implementing a different
approach, the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity, founded by
Kelly Brownell, operates under a mission statement that incorporates,
as its main goals, “to improve the world’s diet, prevent obesity, and
reduce weight stigma.”274  According to Wann, the Rudd Center em-
braces covering while she expressly opposes it.275  Without judging
the value of either approach, health insurance fat taxes brings the
conflict between the two into the foreground, and might inhibit the
work of fat activists who reject covering.
268. See, e.g., Heather McAllister, Embodying Fat Liberation, in THE FAT STUDIES
READER, supra note 1, at 305; see also SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 233–38 (detail- R
ing the acceptance of fatness and the efforts against fat discrimination).
269. See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text.
270. See generally Yoshino, supra note 11, at 772–73, 838–42.
271. See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
272. See Burgard, supra note 199, at 42; Lyons, supra note 1, at 83–85; see also Wil- R
son, supra note 220, at 61 (advocating an approach that balances health and cul-
tural beliefs of beauty and encourages appropriate physical activity and good
nutrition).
273. Marilyn Wann, Foreword to THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at ix. R
Marilyn Wann is the author of FAT!SO?: BECAUSE YOU DON’T HAVE TO APOLOGIZE
FOR YOUR SIZE! (1998) and the creator of “Yay! Scales,” which scales display com-
pliments instead of pounds.  She has also performed with a fat synchronized
swimming team and other fat visual arts groups. See About the Contributors, in
THE FAT STUDIES READER, supra note 1, at 351, 356–57. R
274. FAQs, YALE RUDD CENTER FOR FOOD POL’Y & OBESITY, http://www.yalerudd
center.org/who_we_are.aspx?id=18 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
275. See Wann, supra note 273, at xvii.
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Other similarities between queer covering and fat covering again
demonstrate the extent of alignment between the two identities.  For
example, queer people who cover by being “discreet” or “private” about
their sexuality get to keep their jobs and their children, while “open
and notorious” or “flagrant” queerness revokes those privileges.276
The same is true for fat individuals who reject fatness and embrace
covering (providing for them to keep their children and employment)
and, conversely, individuals who embrace fatness and reject covering
(revoking those privileges).277  Covering demonstrates how “assimila-
tion can be an effect of discrimination as well as an evasion of it.”278
V. FAT RIGHTS, HEALTHY BODIES, AND
EXISTING LEGAL REGIMES
Although the health insurance fat tax regime facially distinguishes
between fat and thin, thus creating covering-type discrimination, the
regime is legal nationwide.  It is true that certain jurisdictions pro-
hibit weight-based discrimination.279  However, health insurance fat
taxes are part of employee benefits programs sponsored by employers
and thus, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act280 (ERISA)
governs their administration.281  ERISA itself contains no antidis-
crimination provision; rather, other federal antidiscrimination laws
provide this type of protection for employees concerning covered bene-
fit plans.282  Consistent with the Congressional intent to fill the field
276. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 850. R
277. See SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 64–77 (”If the Child is Fat, Is the Parent Unfit?”), R
99–121 (discussing weight-based employment discrimination); see also id. at
13–24 (noting that mother was charged with child abuse for not preventing
daughter’s obesity).
278. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 772. R
279. One such jurisdiction is the state of Michigan.  The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act states that “[t]he opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other real
estate, and the full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public ser-
vice, and educational facilities without discrimination because of . . . weight . . . as
prohibited by this act, is recognized and declared to be a civil right.” MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 37.2102(1) (2010).  For an overview of this state law and certain local
ordinances that prohibit discrimination on the basis of appearance, see Rhode,
supra note 2, at 1081–90.  Notably, in 2007–2008, Massachusetts considered a R
bill that would have added weight to its anti-discrimination statute as well. See
Mary Carmichael, Do We Really Need A Law To Protect Fat Workers?, BOSTON
GLOBE  MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, at 26; Laurel J. Sweet, TALL ORDER; Bill Would
Target Bias Based on Weight & Height, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 24, 2008, at A3.
The bill was defeated. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2011) (prohibiting
employment discrimination based only on “race, color, religious creed, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, . . . genetic information, or ancestry,” not weight or
height).
280. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
281. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90–91 (1983).
282. Id. at 104–05 (describing relevant legislative history).
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of law about these plans, ERISA preempts any state antidiscrimina-
tion law that provides protection above the floors set by federal an-
tidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII and the ADA.283  Accordingly,
the only possible laws that might be used to invalidate health insur-
ance fat taxes are those two federal statutes, and neither provides
that result.284  Furthermore, ACA provisions about wellness pro-
grams can be viewed as bolstering the legality of health insurance fat
taxes.285  This set of conclusions and observations creates yet another
question, specifically, why antidiscrimation law, systemically, fails to
operate in a way that consistently combats differential treatment of
individuals whose bodies exhibit non-normative physical characteris-
tics.  The last section of this Part attempts to answer that inquiry.
A. Title VII and the ADA
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment practices based
on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”286  The statute does
not prohibit weight-based rules of employment that apply neutrally
across these identities.  If, however, a facially neutral rule has a dispa-
rate impact on minority employees, based on one of these identities,
then the rule violates Title VII.287  Because of higher rates of fatness
among minority races and women, coupled with the legal normative
construction of a healthy body as white and male, attempts have been
made to invalidate weight rules in employment based on a disparate
impact argument.288  While a few of these cases have been success-
ful289 because of a “sex-plus” or race element,290 fatness alone is not
283. Id. at 102–06 (holding that state antidiscrimination laws consistent with Title
VII are saved from ERISA preemption, but any part of those state laws prohibit-
ing conduct that would be legal under the federal regime is preempted);
Tompkins v. United Healthcare of New England, Inc., 203 F.3d 90, 96–97 (1st
Cir. 2000) (extending the partial preemption holding of Shaw to state antidis-
crimination laws concerning disabilities, as compared to the provisions of the
ADA).
284. It is not the intent here to provide a detailed explication of weight discrimination
cases and analyses under these statutes.  Such work has been done elsewhere.
See, e.g., Browne et al., supra note 243, at 10–27; Korn, supra note 232, at 40–50.
For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to state that current antidiscrimina-
tion law generally does not protect fatness.
285. This Article assumes, arguendo, that the ACA is constitutional.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (delineating the burden of proof in disparate impact
cases).
288. See SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 111–18, 122–26; Rhode, supra note 2, at 1076–78. R
289. See, e.g., Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (invalidating state
prison system height and weight requirements for the position of correctional
counselors because of disparate impact on women, relying on statistical evidence
of such disparate impact), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977).
290. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 1076–77. R
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protected under Title VII.291  Thus, a Title VII challenge would proba-
bly fail, and even if it was successful, fat white men might be excluded
from decisional protection.
Similarly, the ADA292 does not protect all fatness from discrimina-
tion.293  The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment, public ser-
vices, and public accommodations on the basis of a disability, whether
real or perceived.294  Under the statute, a “disability” is defined as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities” or “a record of such an impairment” or “being re-
garded as having such an impairment.”295  In rare circumstances, fat-
ness may be considered an impairment, but such cases require
morbidly obese plaintiffs,296 and even morbidly obese plaintiffs can
lose in court, despite sufficient evidence of discriminatory treatment,
because they cannot meet the definitional elements of “disability” as
such elements have been interpreted by the courts.297  Accordingly,
most fat plaintiffs lose their ADA cases,298 and it seems likely that an
ADA-based challenge brought against health insurance fat taxes
would similarly fail.
B. The ACA
Rather than prohibiting weight-based discrimination, the ACA
might encourage it through its wellness plan participation incentives.
The law contains two antidiscrimination provisions, neither of which
is likely to apply to health insurance fat taxes.  The first states that
“[a] group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage may not establish rules for eligi-
bility (including continued eligibility) of any individual to enroll under
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
292. The ADA applies to private employers, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006), and sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies the same anti-discrimination
provisions to public employers and employers that receive federal funding, see 29
U.S.C. § 794(a), (d) (2006).  The analyses of both statutes proceed in virtually
identical fashions, and guidance for one can be used as guidance for the other.
Thus, for purposes of the analysis herein, reference to the ADA should be under-
stood to include both the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 29
U.S.C. § 794(d) (“The standards used to determine whether this section has been
violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section
shall be the standards applied under [the ADA].”).  Similarly, the analysis of
Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993), see infra notes 328–47 and ac-
companying text, applies to ADA interpretation and application as well.
293. SOLOVAY, supra note 11, at 146; Browne et al., supra note 243, at 22–23; Korn, R
supra note 232, at 28; Rhode, supra note 2, at 1078–80. R
294. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
296. See Korn, supra note 232, at 42–43, 51–52.
297. Rhode, supra note 2, at 1078–81; see infra note 339 and accompanying text. R
298. Rhode, supra note 2, at 1078–81; Korn, supra note 201, at 232.
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the terms of the plan or coverage based on any of the following health
status-related factors . . . .”299  This provision shall be referred to
herein as the “health status rule.”  Weight is not expressly included in
the list of factors, though it could fall under several of those enumer-
ated, such as “health status,” “medical condition,” “medical history,” or
possibly “genetic information,” depending on which experts provide
consultation.300  Even assuming arguendo that weight is included,
this provision likely will not apply to health insurance fat taxes be-
cause it pertains to plan/coverage eligibility, not to the amount paid
for that coverage once enrolled.  The second antidiscrimination provi-
sion states that “an individual shall not, on the ground[s] prohibited
under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . or section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any
[federal] health program or activity.”301  Likely, this provision also
will not apply to health insurance fat taxes because weight is not pro-
tected under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act302 or section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.303  In addition, this second provision applies only
to federal health programs, leaving private employers who do not re-
ceive federal funds beyond the scope of the rule.
Since neither of the antidiscrimination provisions applies, com-
plete focus is turned to the wellness program provisions.  Generally,
under the ACA, a wellness program is “offered by an employer” and
“designed to promote health or prevent disease.”304  The health status
rule notwithstanding, participation in wellness programs may gener-
ate premium discounts, rebates, or other rewards based on health sta-
tus factors, provided certain other programmatic conditions are
satisfied.305
299. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 156 (2010) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (creating new Public Health Service Act § 2705(a) [hereinafter
PHSA]).
300. Id. (creating new PHSA § 2705(a)(1)–(9)).  The vagueness of these enumerated
factors may be alleviated in the future by regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services.  Other sections of the ACA indicate that
health status includes weight. See § 4201(c)(3)–(4) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
300u-13) (requiring community-based prevention health plans to “promote
healthier lifestyles” and “conduct activities to measure changes in the prevalence
of chronic disease risk factors among community members” such as “changes in
weight”); § 4206 (identifying “weight” as a wellness plan health risk factor).
301. § 1557(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116).
302. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (listing race, color, and national origin as the only three
protected identities).
303. See supra notes 292–98 and accompanying text.
304. ACA § 1201 (creating new PHSA § 2705(j)(1)(A)).
305. Id. (referring to new PHSA §§ 2705(j)(1)(B), 2705(j)(1)(C), 2705(j)(3)).  If “all simi-
larly situated individuals” are eligible for the same reward, then a wellness pro-
gram does not base any conditions for obtaining the rebate or reward on health
status factors and thus does not violate the health status rule. Id.  Such pro-
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The primary condition concerns the financial value of the reward.
Specifically, health status distinctions are permissible if the wellness
program participation reward does not exceed 30% of the original cost
of coverage under the applicable health plan.306  Notably, “cost of cov-
erage” includes both employee and employer contributions to the cost
of health care,307 so the reward may be significantly larger than 30%
of just the employee’s contribution.  For example, if the total health
insurance cost per month is $500 and the employee’s contribution is
$150, the reward may carry a value equal to the entire employee con-
tribution (representing 30% of the total cost), rather than only $45
(representing 30% of the employee contribution amount).  The Secre-
taries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury may
increase the reward value to up to 50% of the cost of coverage if they
“determine that such an increase is appropriate.”308  Rewards may in-
clude discounts or rebates of premium payments, partial or full waiv-
ers of cost-sharing responsibilities (such as deductibles, copayments,
and coinsurance), waiver of surcharges for services, or coverage for an
additional service that would not otherwise be covered under the
health plan.309
Several additional conditions apply to wellness program rewards
that differentiate on the basis of health status.310  First, the program
must have “a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or prevent-
ing disease in, participating individuals.”311  It may not be “overly
burdensome, . . . a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health
status factor, . . . [or] highly suspect in the method chosen to promote
grams include reimbursement for fitness center memberships, diagnostic testing
that does not require a specific outcome (e.g., a cholesterol level) in order to ob-
tain the reward, and reimbursement for smoking cessation programs regardless
of whether the individual actually quits. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(2)).
306. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(A)).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(B)–(D)).
311. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(B)).  Other provisions in the ACA indicate
that a programmatic goal of weight loss will satisfy the “improving health” condi-
tion.  For example, the ACA offers “community transformation grants” for “pre-
vention health activities” that are designed to “promote healthier lifestyles.” Id.
§ 4201(c)(3)(A).  Many of the listed activities focus on health foods, nutrition, and
physical activity. Id. § 4201(c)(2)(B).  The success of these activities depends
upon “measure[d] changes in the prevalence of chronic disease risk factors among
community members participating in preventive health activities” such as
“changes in weight.” Id. § 4201(c)(4)(A)–(B).  Similarly, “weight” is listed as a
risk factor for pilot wellness programs based at community health centers that
serve particularly at-risk populations. Id. § 4206 (referring to new PHSA
§ 330(s)(3)(B)(i)).
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health or prevent disease.”312  Also, the reward must be “made availa-
ble to all similarly situated individuals” at least once a year.313  In
order to satisfy this condition, an employer must maintain a “reasona-
ble alternative standard” or waiver of the particular health status
benchmark for individuals for whom it is “unreasonably difficult” or
“medically inadvisable” to meet that benchmark.314  So long as the
wellness program reward system adopted by an employer satisfies
these conditions, the reward system is legal under the ACA, regard-
less of whether it results in health status differentiation.
The Alabama Program exemplifies how ACA wellness programs
justify differentiations based on fatness.  Alabama state employees
whose BMIs are 35 or higher must pay a $25 monthly health insur-
ance fat tax unless they participate in a weight loss program, actually
lose weight, or provide a note from a physician indicating that a medi-
cal condition that precludes weight loss.315  Because the state bills the
program as a method of improving health and includes the doctor’s
note as an alternative method of avoiding the fat tax, it satisfies the
ACA conditions for a legal wellness program.316
312. Id. § 1201 (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(B)).  Again, the vagueness of these
terms and conditions might later be explained in regulations, but the statutory
text provides only this.
313. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(C)–(D)).
314. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(D)(i)).  Employers may seek confirmation
from medical professionals that achieving the benchmark is unreasonably diffi-
cult or medically inadvisable. Id. (referring to new PHSA § 2705(j)(3)(C), (D)(ii)).
315. See supra notes 67–79 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 304–14 and accompanying text.  Information about the total cost
of health insurance coverage is unavailable on the SEIB website.  The author
assumes that the cost of coverage does not exceed the 30% maximum.  Notably, in
April 2009, North Carolina enacted a health insurance fat tax scheme for its state
employees, similar to the Alabama Program.  N.C. Sess. Laws 2009-16, § 2(b)
(creating the “Comprehensive Wellness Initiative”).  This Comprehensive Well-
ness Initiative was set to impose, among other things, a health insurance fat tax
on July 1, 2011, for employees with BMI of 40 or more. See Jennifer Calhoun,
Obese state workers to bear greater health-care costs, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2010/10/13/1039063?sac=
home; Hal Herzog, Fat people aren’t the enemy, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Feb. 4,
2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/02/04/318765/fat-people-arent-the-
enemy.html.  Just a year later, in May 2010, the North Carolina House of Repre-
sentatives filed a bill to repeal the health insurance fat tax.  H.B. 1968, 2009 Gen.
Assemb. (N.C. 2009) (entitled “An Act to Repeal the Body Mass Index (BMI) Pen-
alty From the North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employ-
ees”).  Though the 2010 bill failed, in May 2011, the Comprehensive Wellness
Initiative was repealed in its entirety.  N.C. Sess. Laws 2011-85, § 1.5; 2011-96.
Media coverage and relevant press releases fail to explain the reason for the re-
peal. See, e.g., Press Release, The State Health Plan Prepares for Follow-up En-
rollment (Jun. 10, 2011), http://www.shpnc.org/newsRoom/archives/2011/news_
20110610.aspx.  Perhaps the General Assembly recognized the flaws inherent to
health insurance fat taxes, as described herein.
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C. Collective Cover-up
The above analyses of federal laws demonstrate how the American
legal system supports the perpetuation of anti-fat bias and the main-
tenance of potentially harmful, unrealistic body size norms.  Only one
state in the country protects against discrimination based on fat-
ness.317  That state-based fatness protection, however, effectively be-
comes nullified vis-a`-vis health insurance fat taxes because of the
nature of the legal system governing their administration.318
As suggested earlier,319 this gap in the system results from perva-
sive anti-fat bias and stigma.  Fatness is the one remaining basis on
which people can outwardly judge others without worry of repercus-
sion.320  Cultural norms dictate that fat is bad, a disease that should
be eradicated.321  The country believes that its citizens can, and
should, make their bodies conform to normative thinness.  The current
legal framework reflects this “assimilationist bias.  It maintains that
groups that can assimilate are less worthy of protection than groups
that cannot.  It further suggests that the only acceptable defense to a
demand for assimilation is the inability to accede to it.”322  Stated oth-
erwise, and to use Professor Yoshino’s terminology, when individuals
cannot convert or pass, they receive legal protection from discrimina-
tion based on the underlying identity, such as race, sex, or
disability.323
However, fat individuals cannot pass or convert, and yet they still
have no legal recourse for any repercussions based on their fatness.324
Particularly given the scientific evidence that fatness is not a pure
choice, it seems that society, collectively, should recognize that even
though fat hatred persists, probably it should not.  Collectively, soci-
ety should understand that fat people are not wholly to blame for their
fatness, and yet society torments these individuals specifically be-
cause of their body size.  American lawmakers should acknowledge
given the available medical evidence, that some people are fat, just as
some people are short, and some have blue eyes, and some are Black.
Eye color, for example, is a relatively neutral characteristic;325 gener-
317. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 279–83 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA preemption).
319. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
320. Indeed, Alabama and other employers have already implemented widespread
programs that effectively do so. See, e.g., supra section II.B.
321. See supra, section III.B.
322. Yoshino, supra note 12, at 779. R
323. Id.
324. See supra Part IV.
325. See Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Arts,
Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 66 n.196 (2003); Mary
Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage,
8 U.C.L.A. WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 238 (1998) (identifying eye color as “insignificant”);
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ally, it does not form substantial parts of people’s identities.  Race,
though, does form a person’s identity, whether a person wants it to do
so or not.326  Civil rights law emerged because of the negative conse-
quences of that systemic impact.  Nevertheless, systemic norms about
fatness endure, and no federal law aims to curtail that practice.327
Health insurance fat taxes provide a method for society to perpetu-
ate its anti-fat bias under the cover of promoting health.  The goal
seems good on its face; people want to be healthy.  Looking one step
deeper, however, as this Article has shown, health insurance fat taxes
offer an opportunity to hide systemic anti-fat bias by forcing fat people
to pay for their fatness, their moral failure, their bad bodies.  In short,
the health insurance fat taxes regime creates a vehicle for collective
cover-up of anti-fat bias with the force of the law lending support.
An oft-cited successful weight disability case—Cook v. State of
Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospi-
tals328—illustrates how collective cover-up emerges in ADA329 analy-
sis of fatness.  Bonnie Cook was an attendant at a Rhode Island
residential facility for mentally retarded persons.330  She had a “spot-
less work record” for the five years she worked there, and when she
left, she did so voluntarily.331  After two years, she reapplied for her
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987) (citing to the work of Rich-
ard Wasserstrom and stating that “race does not function in our culture as does
eye color, which is an irrelevant category, an unimportant cultural fact”);
Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 637 (1990) (not-
ing that eye color is “unimportant” and dismissing queries as to whether sex
would ever become similarly unimportant); cf. Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v.
Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1893, 1912 (2004) (identifying eye color as a “morally neutral characteristic”
while sarcastically including race as a similarly neutral characteristic).
326. See Lawrence, supra note 325, at 637; see also Abrams, supra note 221, at 484
(identifying disability and gender dissidence as “socially-imposed identities”).
327. One main distinction between race and gender discrimination, on the one hand,
and fatness discrimination on the other, is the obviousness of that discrimination.
Race has a blatant and facial, social, and legal history of discrimination.  Dating
back to the three-fifths law, through the era of slavery and well into the twenti-
eth century with sanctioned segregation, racial discrimination existed, facially, in
American law. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 101.
The civil rights movement could focus efforts on combating that facial discrimina-
tion and rely thereon when combating more covert discriminatory impacts.  Fat-
ness, however, has no such discriminatory obviousness in its history.  Indeed, the
story of fatness described in Part II precludes such obviousness, since fatness was
formerly a sign of wealth and high social status.  Anti-fat discrimination has al-
ways existed beneath the legal surface.  In this way, collective cover-up as de-
scribed herein may apply to fatness, but might not apply to racism.  Then again,
perhaps affirmative action, retrospectively, was a form of collective cover-up.
328. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
329. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
330. Cook, 10 F.3d at 20.
331. Id.
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position only to be rejected strictly because of her weight, even though
she passed the mandatory pre-employment physical.332  She filed suit
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), based on a “per-
ceived disability” theory, and after surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the jury awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages.333
On appeal, the First Circuit held that morbid obesity qualified as a
“covered impairment” under the RHA, whether actual or perceived.334
Specifically, the court held “the jury reasonably could have found that,
though people afflicted with morbid obesity can treat the manifesta-
tions of metabolic dysfunction by fasting or perennial undereating, the
physical impairment itself—a dysfunctional metabolism—is perma-
nent.”335  Accordingly, the First Circuit upheld the jury’s award to Ms.
Cook.336
This decision, though, perpetuates the same systemic vision of fat-
ness that health insurance fat taxes also perpetuate, namely, that fat-
ness is a bad personal choice deserving of punishment unless a
medical, biological, essentially uncontrollable reason can be estab-
lished.  The result in Cook purports to offer protection from anti-fat
discrimination, but that protection extends only to those individuals
whose fatness rises to a level of morbid obesity and for which a medi-
cal cause can be established.337  In this way, the Cook decision shows
how collective cover-up emerges through the law.  It proffers fat
rights, but only facially and only for a small and specific subclass of
individuals, thereby covering up the lingering systemic anti-fat bias
that still prohibits protection for most fat individuals.
Looking more closely at the details of the decision, collective cover-
up emerges through the First Circuit’s discussions of mutability and
voluntariness.338  Though both issues arose in the context of whether
fatness constitutes an “impairment” under the law, the ultimate im-
pact of mutability and voluntariness appears in the “substantially lim-
iting” component of the disability analysis.339  First, the court stated
332. Id. at 20–21.
333. Id. at 21–22.
334. Id. at 22–23.  To state a successful claim under the RHA against a federally
funded program, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she applied for a position
within the program, (2) she had a “cognizable disability” at the time of applica-
tion, (3) she was nonetheless qualified for the position, and (4) she was not hired
solely because of the disability. Id.; see also supra notes 292–98 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the likely failure of plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA, even if
morbidly obese, and noting that the analysis under section 504 of the RHA is
virtually identical to that applied to claims brought under the ADA).
335. Id. at 24.
336. Id. at 28.
337. Id. at 24.
338. Id. at 23–24.
339. See supra notes 294–95, 335 and accompanying text.  A “disability” is defined as
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
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that the mutability of the plaintiff’s condition is irrelevant to deter-
mining whether or not the condition constitutes an impairment.340
Mutability is nowhere mentioned in the state or regulations, and we see little
reason to postulate it as an automatic disqualifier under section 504.  It seems
to us, instead, that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantial-
ity of the limitation flowing from a given impairment.  So viewed, mutability
only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly re-
verse by behavioral alteration from coming within section 504.341
What, then, happens to fat people who are perceived to be able to “eas-
ily and quickly” change their fatness?  They fall outside the protection
of the law.  Similarly, under the “law of the case”342 described above,
morbid obesity resulting from metabolic dysfunction is a permanent
condition justifying a finding of an impairment.  Mutability might pro-
tect the morbidly obese from discrimination, but only if they can es-
tablish a medical reason for their fatness.  Other individuals, who
cannot show a malfunctioning metabolism, are still blamed for their
activities” or “a record of such an impairment” or “being regarded as having
such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 1201(1) (2006).  In 2008, Congress passed cer-
tain amendments to the ADA.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–12213 [hereinafter ADAAA].  One such amendment, in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475
(1999), stated that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative ef-
fects of mitigating measures such as . . . medication, medical supplies, equip-
ment, or appliances, . . . prosthetics . . . , hearing aids . . . , mobility devices, . . .
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or . . . learned behav-
ioral or adaptive neurological modifications.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(4)(E)(i).  At
least one scholar has posited that this change in the law means that “[a]ny idea
that a plaintiff who is obese would have to diet or have bariatric surgery has now
been laid to rest.”  Korn, supra note 201, at 242.  This is a questionable result.
Health insurance fat taxes require exactly that—diet or bariatric surgery or some
other effort to lose weight.  The difference between weight loss “mitigating mea-
sures” and, say, hearing aids or prosthetics is that the underlying condition asso-
ciated with the latter group enumerated in the ADAAA is considered immutable.
The aid may help an individual cope or otherwise live with the particular condi-
tion, but the condition remains.  Fatness is still envisioned as wholly mutable,
and within this construction, weight loss changes the underlying condition, alle-
viating the impairment. See also infra notes 341–46, 349–52 and accompanying
text (discussing the First Circuit’s analysis involving the mutability and volunta-
riness of the plaintiff’s weight).
340. Cook, 10 F.3d at 23–24.
341. Id. at 23 n.7.  This interpretation is set forth in dicta, arising out of the court’s
critique of the trial court’s instruction to the jury that a “condition or disorder is
not an impairment unless it . . . constitutes an immutable condition that the per-
son affected is powerless to control.” Id. at 23.  The First Circuit found this in-
struction to be “problematic” because immutability is not an automatic
prerequisite for establishing an impairment. Id. at 23 n.7.  The court nonetheless
determined that the imperfect instruction was harmless error, since the jury had
evidence showing that metabolic dysfunction was a permanent condition and that
permanency, in this case, ran in favor of Ms. Cook. Id. at 24.
342. Id. at 23 n.7.
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fatness and systemically held responsible for whatever consequences
might stem from that fault.  The underlying biases against fatness
persist; the Cook decision maintains the position that people who can
change their fatness should (and, arguably, must) do so.343
Further, the court held that regardless of the actual immutability
of the condition, an employer’s perception of an immutable condition
will suffice to establish an impairment under the RHA.344  Though
this vision of fatness played to the plaintiff’s favor in Cook,345 the vi-
sion could have opposite results for many other fat people whom soci-
ety perceives as simply lazy or lacking in will power.  It may be easy
for fat activists to see the appeal of the perceived disability theory; it
provides a vehicle for showing that fatness is not necessarily a disa-
bling condition even though society views it as such.  It also provides a
legal hook on which to hang a fat discrimination case when there may
be an absence of an underlying impairment.  Unfortunately, this be-
lies the normative point.  Not all fat is bad or impairing,346 and a legal
theory relying on the contrary narrow vision of fatness perpetuates
the social perception of the falsity.  Indeed, disability rights scholars
and activists have offered a similar critique.347  The perpetuation of a
vision that fat is bad simultaneously perpetuates collective cover-up of
anti-fat bias, especially in the context of legal decisions that seem to
advance fat rights.
Second, as to voluntariness, the court stated that the cause of the
condition is likewise irrelevant to the decision of whether the condi-
343. See id. at 24.
344. Id.
345. Id.  “[T]he jury reasonably could have inferred that [the employer] regarded
plaintiff’s morbid obesity as an ‘impairment of a continuing nature,’ . . . and that
he rejected her application on that basis.” Id. (quoting Evans v. City of Dallas,
861 F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir. 1988)).
346. Some fat activists who adopt this position believe that disability law is an inap-
propriate venue for combating anti-fat bias. See generally SOLOVAY, supra note
11, at 129–33.  They contend that achieving systemic “normalcy” depends on R
avoiding a vision of fatness as a disabling condition; fatness is not an impairing
condition and should not need to be treated as such just to confront social norms.
Id.  Similarly minded fat rights activists believe that associating with another
marginalized group will hurt the movement. Id.  Certain members of the dis-
abled community also oppose using the ADA to provide fat rights, wanting no
association between disability and fatness, because they have worked to change
the social construction of disability from disgust to respect; associating with fat-
ness would, in their eyes, be a step backward. Id.  Critical disability scholars,
however, would likely disagree with the premises of these arguments, who con-
ceptualize disability not as a transgression that disabled people should conquer,
but instead “as a social and political force” to advocate for the advancement of
disability rights. DORIS ZAMES FLEISCHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 4, 13 (2001).  Labeling fat-
ness a disability, though it might be a convenient legal hook in certain circum-
stances, is not without controversy or negative consequences.
347. See FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 346, at 13.
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tion constitutes an impairment, but nonetheless pertains to the “sub-
stantially limiting” analysis.348
The Rehabilitation Act contains no language suggesting that its protection is
linked to how an individual became impaired, or whether an individual con-
tributed to his or her impairment.  On the contrary, the Act indisputably ap-
plies to numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary
conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting from cigarette
smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various types, and the like.
Consequently voluntariness, like mutability, is relevant only in determining
whether a condition has a substantially limiting effect.349
Again, this language seems like a positive for disability protection of
fatness, but upon closer scrutiny, it plays to the anti-fat bias running
just beneath the surface of society, manifested through the legal sys-
tem.  In this way, the passage is somewhat misleading.
Voluntariness might not bear relevance to the origination of the
impairment, but it does impact its continued existence, which, as the
court noted, influences the determination of whether an impairment
can be “substantially limiting.”350  In Cook, the court held that “the
jury certainly could have concluded that the metabolic dysfunction
and failed appetite-suppressing neural signals were beyond plaintiff’s
control and rendered her effectively powerless to manage her
weight.”351  Fatness, in its usual depiction, can be managed if only fat
individuals could control themselves (or so the rhetoric goes).  Accord-
ing to mainstream anti-fat bias, fatness is not just caused by a volun-
tary action, but also perpetuated and maintained by continued
choice.352  The pervasive conception of body size choice precludes obes-
ity from ADA coverage.353  The social norm dictates that people
should be able to lose weight and keep it off, even if science dictates
the opposite conclusion.  So, collective cover-up emerges through vol-
untariness in two ways: the underlying impairment perpetuates the
systemic vision that fatness is bad and inhibiting, and the “substan-
tially limiting” analysis perpetuates the systemic vision that fatness is
a choice, so fat people deserve whatever punishments they receive.
348. Cook, 10 F.3d at 24.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See supra section III.B.
353. Applying this construction to a different context, consider a smoker who develops
a cough that could be alleviated through smoking cessation.  Probably that cough
does not constitute a disabling impairment.  A choice to continue smoking and
perpetuate the cough will not bring that cough within the jurisdiction of the ADA.
If the cough develops into lung cancer, however, then the cancer is protected.  It
cannot be cured simply by quitting smoking.  Similarly, if a person broke a leg
skiing, let it heal, and the day after the cast was removed broke it again, the
perpetual state of the injured leg still would not result in a finding that the per-
son had a disabling injury.
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Though the First Circuit provided relief for Bonnie Cook, the case
laid the groundwork, through collective cover-up, for continued and
legally justified anti-fat bias.  Similarly, the ADA, Title VII, and the
ACA demonstrate statutory collective cover-up of anti-fat bias, exem-
plified by the legality of health insurance fat taxes.
VI. CONCLUSION
If society wants to achieve its public policy goal of widespread
health, then it should curtail counterproductive policies and programs
that create, rather than remove, barriers to accessing the health care
system.  Legal health insurance fat tax programs354 do just that for a
population that already faces numerous challenges within that sys-
tem.  Certainly others may disagree.  Professors Kristin Madison, Ke-
vin Volpp, and Scott Halpern recently voiced support for wellness and
other “incentive programs” promoted through the ACA as a poten-
tially useful method to “improve public health.”355  Specifically, they
state that “[i]ndividuals often fail to take the steps necessary to im-
prove their own health,”356 such as losing weight,357 and that “one
advantage to an appropriately designed incentive program is that it
can help individuals overcome the barriers they face in trying to avoid
disease and disability.”358  They also state that distinctions in people’s
abilities to conform to the requirements of the so-called incentive pro-
grams, such as food deserts359 and biological factors that might render
thinness an unachievable goal, “do not necessarily imply that incen-
tive programs impermissibly discriminate.”360  The analysis offered
above, however, illustrates exactly that implication as a result of
354. See Yoshino, supra note 12, at 938 (“[T]he current [antidiscrimination] paradigm R
errs prescriptively in extending greater protections to those who cannot change,
and errs descriptively in characterizing identities like race and sex as being inca-
pable of any kind of change.”).
355. Madison et al., supra note 29, at 465. R
356. Id.
357. Id. at 454.
358. Id. at 456.
359. See, e.g., America’s ‘food deserts’, THE WEEK (Aug. 12, 2011), http://theweek.com/
article/index/218167/americarsquos-food-deserts (defining a food desert as any
census district where at least 20% of the inhabitants are below the poverty line
and 33% live over a mile from the nearest supermarket).
360. Id.  Stanford law professor Richard Ford agrees. See RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL
CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 134–38 (2005) (noting that weight-based discrimination
might be unfair, “[b]ut there are good reasons that anti-discrimination law does
not prohibit all ‘unfair’ discrimination, reserving what Brain [sic] Barry calls ‘the
ponderous machinery of the law’ for the most pressing, pervasive and stigma-
tizing wrongs”); RICHARD T. FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS
MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 132, 159 (2008). But see RHODE, supra note 3, at R
102, 104.
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health insurance fat taxes, evidenced through fat covering and collec-
tive cover-up.
Perhaps new federal law that attends to collective cover-up would
also generate improvements regarding individual covering.  One pos-
sible method of addressing collective cover-up of anti-fat bias is
through a new federal law modeled after state lifestyle discrimination
statutes.361  Generally, these statutes protect employees from discrim-
ination based on off-duty “lifestyle” choices such as smoking, sexual
relationships, or leisure activities.362  These statutes essentially pit
the employer’s business interests against the employee’s privacy inter-
ests, and declare a victor.363  The problem with this model for anti-fat
bias, of course, is that it still relies on a systemic vision of fatness as a
personal choice.364  Nonetheless, the model may provide a useful
starting point.
361. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2009).
362. See generally Sugarman, supra note 4, at 418–20 (discussing statutes preventing
various off-duty lifestyle choices from being considered in employment decisions).
363. Id.
364. See id. at 392.
